The Basic Problem of the Theory of Levels of Reality

This academic paper by Roberto Poli, affiliated with the University of Trento and the Mitteleuropa Foundation, provides a comprehensive examination of the theory of levels of reality. Poli begins by situating the discussion within the intellectual legacy of Nicolai Hartmann, whose work on categorial perspectives and stratified reality serves as the primary foundation for the inquiry. The author notes that while the theory of levels has influenced thinkers like Bertalanffy and Lorenz, it remains an under-discussed topic in contemporary literature, often conflated with levels of interpretation or description rather than being treated as a strictly ontological matter.

Poli distinguishes between two main approaches to defining levels: the objectual standpoint, which views levels as collections of units interacting at different degrees of granularity, and the categorial standpoint, which characterizes levels by their specific ontological categories. He argues that the objectual approach, while useful for natural sciences, is insufficient for understanding 'tangled' hierarchies and fails to address the categorial differences between material, mental, and social realms. The author asserts that the material stratum acts as a bearer for the mental and social strata, but each stratum possesses its own unique principles, laws, and categories. Applying the categories of one realm to another results in a categorial error, or 'metabasis eis allo genos'.

The paper further explores the laws of categorial dependence and autonomy as formulated by Hartmann. These laws dictate that while higher strata may comprise categories of lower strata, the reverse is not true, and the introduction of 'novelty' at higher levels prevents simple reductionism. Poli also addresses the complex issue of causality, arguing that a level of reality is distinguished by its specific form of causality. He challenges the traditional rejection of downward causality, citing the work of Donald Campbell and others, and suggests that a theory of levels is essential for addressing inter-level causal relationships.

Throughout the text, Poli highlights several unresolved problems, including the relationship between real and ideal worlds, the distinction between possibility and potentiality, and the need for a more sophisticated understanding of feedback and control echelons within systems. He concludes that the theory of levels is an obligatory point of departure for a well-developed ontology, and that its further elaboration requires a significant modification of the metaphysics implicit in much of contemporary science and philosophy. The paper serves as a call for a more rigorous, non-reductionist approach to understanding the stratified nature of reality.