Correspondence regarding the transfer of the UFO program from intelligence to scientific oversight

This collection of documents chronicles the internal Air Force debate between 1960 and 1962 regarding the management and future of the Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO) program, specifically Project Blue Book. The correspondence begins with Dr. J. Allen Hynek, a consultant to the Aerospace Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), suggesting to General B. C. Holzman in February 1960 that the scientific aspects of the UFO problem should be transferred from an intelligence-focused division to a scientific one, such as the Geophysics Research Directorate. Hynek argued that the intelligence context created an 'aura of mystery' and public distrust, whereas a scientific approach could better analyze atmospheric phenomena.

By April 1962, the discussion intensified following a briefing for Mr. Edward R. Trapnell, Assistant for Public Relations to the Secretary of the Air Force. Trapnell had become interested in the matter after discussions with Dr. Robert Calkins of the Brookings Institute, who suggested that the Air Force's involvement in UFOs was causing unnecessary negative publicity and that an independent citizen committee might be a better approach. The Foreign Technology Division (FTD), which had assumed responsibility for the program, prepared reports for internal review. FTD concluded that after 15 years and over 7,300 cases, there was no evidence that UFOs were interplanetary vehicles or a threat to national security.

FTD strongly recommended discontinuing the UFO program as a special project. They proposed that the responsibility for investigating sightings should be absorbed by local Air Force facilities, with the primary objective being the determination of threat potential rather than the identification of every object. FTD officials argued that transferring the program to another agency, such as NASA or the Smithsonian, was not feasible because those agencies would not want to inherit the associated public relations burden. If the program were to continue, FTD suggested it be divorced from intelligence and placed under a scientific structure, staffed by personnel capable of conducting an effective public relations program to eventually phase out the project. The documents reflect a consistent effort by the Air Force to minimize the program's profile and shift the burden of public perception away from the intelligence community.