PM ang rymdprojektiler

This memorandum, dated November 21, 1946, and authored by B. Sandmark, provides a critical assessment of the Swedish military's organizational structure regarding the monitoring of 'space projectiles' (rymdprojektiler). The author highlights several systemic weaknesses, primarily the slow transmission of reports to Stockholm, which hinders timely action. The document notes that while radar monitoring (er-spaning) has successfully detected aerial objects within a 6 km radius and ships suspected of being linked to these projectiles, the current lack of coordination prevents effective response. The author proposes seven specific recommendations to improve the situation. These include establishing optical air surveillance on southern Öland and the mainland, using naval surveillance and aerial photography to identify sea-based objects, and conducting investigations to ensure no command centers for these projectiles exist on Öland. Furthermore, the author suggests densifying the radar network with new stations at Kristianopel, Torhamn, and Kapelludden, while closing the station at Simrishamn. The document also calls for the integration of radio monitoring and the potential deployment of anti-aircraft (lv) and fighter (jakt) units. Crucially, the author argues that the management of these diverse monitoring efforts—including radar, naval, air, radio, and anti-aircraft assets—must be centralized in the active area rather than being directed from Stockholm through bureaucratic conferences involving multiple agencies such as Fst, Ast, Ainsp, the Navy, the Air Force (FV), FF, FRA, and FOA.