Revised Oct 80 DEPAJ;TMENT OF DEFENC This cover is to be used only for ofj Number AR 111 is to be used._iiiiii;;;;;;;;iiiiir;/1 Referred to Al...oo' .Jr7vt:;O..J ARCHIVAL ACTION Referred to INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE FILING OF CORRES- PONDENCE AND THE HANDLING OF FILES ARE CONTAINEDINDEPARTMENTALAND SINGLE SERVICE MANUALS File Number CLOSELY RELATED FILES Referred To of Defence Referred To Date Referred T o FILE LOCATION CARD When Complete Use Other Side Rule out last column on front of card before commencing entries on this side. Date Referred To Date Referred To Date SECUrrry LA.'SifiCA~ ON Write or Pnnt Clearly J A3 A . ~OG .S1a e-M 1 or g /a>Fs ~IAJV1 J.owt~/ (.) fPJ loki~ For lntomat1on OPE.R.47rtOJ ~ose.. &tCDtJJI rM., Signature Rani A1 p 10 rr Phc e No SECURI1Y LAS"'FICATION 20 CU 'f'"OR SIIGlNA'rU-Rt SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS! SECURITY CLASSI F ICATION Write or Print Clearly MEMORANDUM Appointment ' 'hone No SECURITY CLASSI F ICATI ON ACrtOI ""0 RE!:PLV DIRECT lCOPV HQWLM} BSWI...M AOMINSO ...... v 77SQN R6PL V TO OC 0 :.O / 20 CU FOR SIGNATURE ~ 00 REPt...VTO OPERATION 'CLOSE ENCOUNTER' Reference: HQOC 073/SOINT SIC EAI of 300350ZJUN83 INTRODUCTION 1. Refere nce A reported a series of unidentified radar contacts at the Area Approach Control Centre (AACC} Mascot, stating, inter alia, that their movement was consistent with that of aircraft and that technicians at the AACC had indicated they could only have been caused by man-made objects. These sightings had allegedly taken place over several weeks, one having aprarently been corroborated by an operator at 3CRU. 3 . As a result of this message RAAF Base Williamtown was directed at about 2000 hours on Thursday 30 June 1983 to mount an investigation. At 0600 hours on Friday 1 July 1983, therefore, 2 Mirage interceptors were placed on Alert 2 under the tactical control of 3CRU which simultaneously started round the clock surveillance in an attempt to correlate any findings with Mascot. Operation 'Close Encounter' was begun. 4 . This report is tendered to record the subsequent investigation into the alleged unidentified flyin g objects (UFO} by 3CRU. INVESTIGATION Initial Reports 5 . As the surveillance team was set up the initia l report at Reference A was examined. Unfortunately the information presented was vague but it was established that 3CRU was never operating at the time of any incident listed. Air Defence personnel were questioned whether they had seen a ny similar phenomena but nothing positive was found. 6 , XO 3CRU held telephone conversations with two su~cessive Senior Area Controllers (SAC} at DOA, Mascot to iNvestigate movement patterns. Relying on memory alon e these gentlemen were of the opinion that contacts had appeared ~ostly north or south of Sydney, travelling mostly north o r north-east. Radial interference or 'marching men' was initially suspected by 3CRU office~ but DOA reported that some s light alterations in headinc had been observed which is not typical of this type of interference. t\lTuaGTED RES. -filG-r~D 1 . A careful watch was set up and contact established with Sector 8 (RAAF ATC) Mascot which was requested to report any further contacts. Several were reported on the first day but were fleetingly held by Sydney with nothing at all seen by either 3CRU or WLM SURAD. These contacts were again well to the north of Sydney and 3CRU should have been in a more favourable position to pick them up. As the RSR has no height finder nothing could be determined in the vertical plane except that the alleged speeds suggested high altitude. Tactics for p rovisional intercepts were designed accordingly, being essentially a supersonic acceleration at best acceleration altitude, followed by a climbing approach. 'Clean' aircraft were made available for maximum operational effectiveness and authority to use the full performance of the aircraft regardless of location was given. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 8 . Notwithstanding the number of contacts emanating from the 23 em wavelength RSR, orders were passed that no scramble would occur unless contact was held on the 3CRU (10 em) radar, with control carried out by a qualified officer. Thus no aircraft were launched on the first day. 9 . A further analysis of sightings was made on the evening of 1 July 1983, using evidence from a survey of AACC tapes going as far back as possible. From this it appeared that no sightings had occurred between 1000 hours and 1600 hours (local) over sevPral weeks. Aircraft were released between these hours on 2 July 1983. 1 0 . As the operation progressed, however, it became clear that no such clear-cut chronological pattern existed Nevertheless most contacts persisted in a narrow sector of about 30 between 70 and 150 n miles north of Sydney, heading between 020 and 050 at speeds estimated between 600 and 3600 knots. Some 'painted' for no more than a few sweeps of the RSR. No sonic booms were reported at these times and no correlating returns were held by 3CRU or SURA9, although brief excitement was generated by an occassional descending meteorological balloon. 11. The standard of reporting by AACC personnel continued to be vague and incomplete and there was no ready explanation of why contacts were being reported well within the Round Mountain Unattended Radar (RMUA) coverage. A team of 3 Air Defence Controllers was therefore despatched to the AACC at PM hours on 2 July 1983 to begin continuous operation at Sector 7 . This team consisted of SONLDR B . Niblett, CC JCRU, graduate o f the GDEW course, FLTLT J . Garden, ADCI 3CRU, a former RADTECH, AND FLGOFF S . Snow, 114CRU, who had completed the Identification Officer' s Course. 1 2 . These officers were b riefed to undertake three tasks, a . To plot as accurately as possible every contact, calculating a precise heading and spoed and e ~mining general characteristics, b . To control interceptors against these contacts if a reasonable chance of interception presented itself, and c . To seek a technical explanation of why these contacts were not seen at all by the Investigations at Mascot AACC 13. PLGOFF Snow, being first to arrive, began operations at 1430 hours on 2 July 1983. Upon plotting one or two contacts sweep by sweep he was able to report a slight clockwise spiral movement. This wns consistent with a type of radar inte rfereYJct, colloquially known as 'running rabbits' and immediately explained why all previously reported alterations of course had been minor and to the right. 14. Follow up action by the remainder of the team from about 1630 hours consisted of: checking the background of what had been reported by AACC staff, establishing whether or not the RMUA had generated any of the contacts, c . requesting assistance to conduct a technical investigation into the performance of the RSR by implementing suitable test procedures, and d . the implementation of such test procedures and analysis of results. In the first instance it became apparent that none of the technical staff would admit to the statement that the objects observed were likely to be man-made, a key element in Reference A, and, in the second instance, technical staff were adamant that no contacts had been generated by the RMUA, on which the presentation of tracks is computer-initiated and transmitted by data link to Mascot. Overlap by the Sydney RSR, however, does occur into the RMUA area up to 165 n miles from Sydney. 16. In the third instance, CC JCRU asked whether any comparison had been carried out between the AACC Operators' presentation and the technical maintenance radarscope in the workshop across the corridor from the AACC at the time of the sightings. This rather elementary test had not been done, although the phenomena had been noticed since early June. 17. Further enquiries revealed that a test picture could be taken from several stages in the receiver chain of the RSR and a test procedure was set up accordingly. When the ptcture generated by the radar processor was examined in conjunction with an AACC sighting, definite solid bars of interference occurred on the same radial. By the time this information was further refined within the radar, however, it was obviously presented to the operator in the AACC as a rapidly moving, aircraft-like contact. 18. A pi ~ure WP S then drawn from a position as close to the waveguide inlets for both receivers as possib P. This meant that virtually 'raw' video would be observed on the maintenance 'scope. While this would also p resent weather returns, g round clutter, etc, a n y solid object in the radar beam capable of returning an echo would be seen at that stage. the time when the customary phenomena were being observed in the AACC, no moving airborne objects appeared in the corresponding position as raw video. These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt that the unidentified objects reported by Sydney were generated entirely by radar interference affecting firs t opportunity t o discuss the matter with senior technical staff at DOA occurred on Monday 4 July 1983. At a suitably arranged conference agreement was reache d that the radar contacts in question were not man-made. A cautiously worded press statement was released as a result in a manner that would not embarrass departmental personnel. 3CRU was stood down from the operation at 1620 hours that day. COSTS OF OPERATION 20. The events controlled by 3CRU were held to as low a key as possible commensurate with the efficient running of the operation. The unit was placed in two twelve-hour shifts with minimum maintenance staff to cover the various major equipments and sufficient operational personnel to e nsure that an a lert surveillance/Lracking/intercept t eam was on watch aL all times. Some extra equipment and administrative effort was also required. 21. Even so 66~ man days of overtime was accrued by enlisted members, being 37~ to maintenance, 6 for administration/ equipment support and 23 to operations. Officers were rostered for a considerable number of extra duties and some attended voluntarily. 22. Service transpor t and accommodation was used for the detachment to Mascot AACC. This involved a bout 1000 km travelled by staff car and nine man days of incidental allowances and out of pocket meal claims as member wer e largely absent from Service messes at standard meal times. One ClJO may have bee n diverted to Sydney Airport to deliver FLGOFF Snow on the 23. Planned maintenance at 3CRU was disrupted and fell behind by 3 days and No 6 Air Defence Identificati o n Officer' s Course started a day late because students and instructors were required to stand-to durin g the operation, a n d No 6 Myriad Maintenance Programmer' s Course was delayed by 3 days through lack of access to equipment. RESPONSE BY 3CRU MEMBERS 2 4 . The response by JCRU members throughout was e*emplary. Although nothing was sighted and the incoming reports given littJ~ credence from the earliest stages, all Op rations ~tight personnel applied themselves to the task OL" j MJJU J '-II with the utmost seriousness and concentration, to the extent that individual COMPOPs were reluctant to break for meals in case the software became unserviceable in their absence. 26. The radar, software and support systems operated without a break throughout the entir e period, which reflects credit upon unit technicians. Moreover the radar picture remained at all times of high quality, engendering confidence in its use. The greatest p raise is reserved for the AACC investigatory team. These officers at ver y short notice undertook an open-ended attachment involving long hours of travel and duty ~nd irregu~ar meals. In swift order they established the fact3 anJ set up definitive tests to display wherein the fault lay. In dealing witn civilians in an awkward situation a considerable amount of tact had to be displayed, realizing the strong union influence within the DOA o rganization. CONCLUSIONS 27. The UFO sigl1tings at AACC 1'-lascot, having occurred over a period of several weeks before becoming the subject of a highly charged message, elicited puzzlement rather than belief among ADGE personnel. Their pattern and speeds were inconsistent and irrational and nothing had been reported by any other agency. 28. On the spot investigations by suitably qualified Air Defence controllers quickly resulted in a convincingly negative report. The methods used in these investigations were reasonably elementary and could have been instigated between AACC operational and technical staff in the preceeding weeks. The lines or communication, extending as they did across the width of an entire corridor, seem to have been insufficient for the purpose. 29. 3CRU staff responded willingly and cheerfully, working continuously in 1 2 hour shifts or remaining on standby at home without being ordered. Enlisted members accrued overtime was high, maintenance and training fell behin~ and some incidental costs were incurred. RECOMMENDATIONS 30. Phenomena such as initiated this operation should be thoroughly analysed as soon as they occur, using such methods as: a . comparison between various sensors covering the same area, accurate plotting and evaluation of the movements of the observed objects, seekinp advice and assistance from better ed or more experienced personnel lli.v J u 1 L when available, and d . conducting a thorough internal investigation o f electronic equipment by settin g suitable tes t procedures in train and anal y sing results, e . investigating any source of practical jokes. 31. An alert over an entire air defence sect o r should be a last step in the investigatory chain, not the first. 32. The importance of data -linking the various radar sensors in a n air defence sector is highlighted. Work has begun on this and should be allocated a high prior1ty . 33. Finally the importance of an up to date recall plan is emphasized. Tn this 3CRU is well served by computer print-out. Record and Plo t from 302035Z Record and Plot Record and Plot (K. A. KEE AN) U F'O contacts by AACC Chronological record o f UFO contacts throughout Operation Close Encounters 1'~ rlY ,.J,CC JYir: . Y l<tW.M Rl:." 'QRTt.D BY BRG/:tJ: GE IIDG ~3l-EED HJ .~ !.ld\8 t>YD {JO) .... YlJ1'))J 0)0 }'J,:..;T( l) HcJd 1 ? Seconds. t.ot seen by ?CRl SYD 275:..-YD105 ~;\/ F'AST Held briefly. Not seen by 30RU YD )ft0SYD130 ? ~ H~ld briefly. ~ot seen by 3CRU SYD (079BYD127) 070 ...:10\.J Cl,wsified Met Balloon. Held by oo~JYD1'l5 :!0ld ? .\Jeeps. ,)t held by 3Crm. ~ \J'e"'s. Not s en by 3CTJ. 3 ~l\ rr >S. Not !"Pen by 3CRU. ll''ry b~f J Y D. Sirrle echo. >in ~1e e cho. Nothing seen by 3CF Not ~cLn by 3CHU. Not seen by 3CRU. Not seen b y 3CRU. Henort ~s faster than norma l jet trrffic. Held f o r 20 Nmiles by ~YD. Nothing seen by 3CRU. briefly. Nothing seen b y 3CI by >YD. Nothing seen b y 3CHU. V.r~.ST 1rob,bly rear war nee of 221 4 ~tr<'Ck. No thine; se n b y )CRU Unf' ~weep. Hot ~;een by 3CRU 'l'r;'c 1{ a H)earf"d tv turn onto 030 2 t tr ld by .3Yl.J 1 e.>s th<m 2 mins. Not Peen b~ 3CRU. Fast indicates not below 600 1<.nots. speeds anear well i n excess of 1000 knots. ( Z ) R}; tJUHT~D BY ,j CIJ'v dHG I ::YI)/.W] ~ ~ L l J:"lJ.Jt KS Eeld briefly by brirfly by SYD. )lotted by 3CRU on paper, TllJG, and '_,t D \vorks 1)50 knots I'ot SC'C'l1 by s wcens <Jt ])rtint s . Not seen ( possibly relnted to '"revious .1eld briefly. Not contact by l'llJ1 A -:l FIGH 1 ? miJes No SPD/HT glven.