DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2009-068, document no. 212 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 14,2015 DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY NORAD/NORTHCOM/CSO SEPTEMBER 2009 FOR OfFICIAL USE ONLY SPECI~l NDUNG REUUIRD . Th1s document is releasable onlv to U.S. and Canalllilll Nationals APR 1 -J9S8 Portion identified as non respons ive to the appeal Ilfo:'VTER Cf.lEi.:UG:Al... ROCKET PERFORJYtANCE SOUCWT: l"HROUG1l iNCR.E:A:SED "CHA:MI3 1.t. PREsstlltE s Portion identified as non responsive to the appeal Portion identified as non responsive to the appeal COSMOS. 2.08 .ANOTHER RECCJ:; SAT!::.LI,.l'!"'F;, OVE~LAfls li' J~!t;i~T-OF n~CC~ CCSMOS"2u7 !ith reC"c:t:: . <>'at~uu., this 'f~>ll r. G_qsMO$. .2:<19 T~,ST"~Dl\. MA N-E.llVE !UNO SYS. 'l'E~i PUOBABL)' FOR MH,l"l'.ARY Ml$SlO N App ;'...,tly tb1,rd of.a t~u....Serics. MORE LU lAR L.4 tJNCHES EXPJi:CTED SO.O N, AS SOVIETS "RESUME T HE.l.R ASSAULT ON THE MCidN BA.O:Gll.P . b omber ilt ,Sovi~t.. Aiduld (0~""<1i',l~U\L l.lS GN;ti Y'} lit..-.m AVla~ion W15(!~ Uf\d .S_po<;e t~lwo1(,~y} . 4J, 44, a~tHS ot thb r.~U... ll"N: bta::ik. ~ 1'U\LUS ON-LY Portion identified as non responsive to the appeal Better Chemtcal Rocket Performance Sought Through Increased Chamber Pressure_ Soviet interest in- r a ising the performanc e of d1emical-pr opellant -rockets _by increasing the charobe:r pressure has bee~ evident at int-ernational scien tific cpngresses, anq in. what is.kno..vn -oi the USSR s space laU:llchers.. lt is felt t-hat the S.ovi ets, to 'il"r\prove rocket perf.o:nrtance.,. -a-xe ~ploring t:hambe-r pressures i,n tJ1e 2, .000-:-3:,000 ps.i (pounds p e r squa~e< inch)''rinlge.-' -. G~ins in mis:$i'~e ped<>~ma;nce throu~h imp:r.o-ve8 h-emic~l propellants a:r e likely t-O be li;:pited. w~th a few -e~ce. p.ti~t}.S' suc~P, ~s f~p~;tJile' ~ltd 4 ,rog:e;p,o' There i s 't'Oom for appl:'e.'C'-:iab1e g~ins h-owev ex-,, by i!(.crea sll,lg c omb-gstjcm c ha.m ber p-res :su.r e s. 'J; he S o v iet s evitiLe~tl;y' b:ave: .b.e en fol:lo g th.i~. <li.RE~Gach pr~vio-q..sly. Th~i:r ~D..,Ht7 'e.hf'in-~. u s .ed in 'fhe h mail;l ~pa,ce bopst~l" , .the uses 1..0 2f_;k e..rose:ll'e at 6~ aqp:os phe t ei!> ptT. ~-ssiJ,l:. e (.S8:5 psi} with a b e orted speeific ~ptds:e (1 )'Pfi_:n4 s econd s . Th:e '!!)'S counter part, the .6Uas sust.:ainer, PJ>eil>rat e .s at ab~i.G:CH1:!l:S:i wit h a~ J.p: @;f ab'out.$'0.'0 -~econCl-s,. 'Tlie.. ltl:))"L19:.), l."ls'~d iii tfi~\lflrp~r .stat o ,.cJ0s.~9s r-~s~;r.cli. s: ceH-i'te-s, ope D-ab: s . a~ 9'Q ph:~q; .~lll7-5 p~:i) ~'\trha :m~po.rtect ,v>:a:te'\.i.tti; lsp,of 362 sec~mds ufi'ing dii:netny.l , .zd.tlle -oxyg-en ~ th~ p-ro:p pt. Lnc.:r;:e~sed c!lla,mbe;r p .s;U:tte~ hav e :the disadvant;.tge a! ,req\'Ui'.ring hea'v,ic t missi,le s-tnu.qtui.-,e . ~'rhi"~was e.~i 't: Hor;n t:n~ . lieq.vy E~cate~ 1)S. }~ i.n.th $ovi<e:t HJ)...-ll. 07, whic'h was s hpwn atct~e Pat<:i::;-Ai'r $h,ow , a,.;s COil)f.lj? M ' ith t:h:e much co.ns'i il ihr J ut-.ur..e ad:y;~l'ilo~a J;1$ q.\l'ernica~.:p.l" Q-Jiella-n1: :r'oc:'lket>s. -- (-6 O"NF'iUEfiTIAL) IPortion identified as non-l I responsive to the appeal Portion identified as non responsive to the appea l Military Spe.nd.il)'g _in U'S'SR Forced Up By Brmtder Goals of Khrtrsban.ev' s Su~;eessors Soviet miH-tary spe..ncUng h as always t<i~en .l,lp ~ dis p~oportio.nate share of the gr.oss national product {GNP) oJ the USSR . Un.der the Brezhnev Kos ygin leadership, milit~.t:y spending. is p.tog.re~ssively taking up still larger $ ha -ef! -of the GNP. In 1.968., ft<n the thi-rd yea-r i n a :row,, th:e r i$e, h r outlays will probably equal or ~xa,eea the rate ci! growth of the S'b:ici t econor:n:y.. Th:e i'ncrea:~es of 1 9.6 6 and r96-'7 had already swel~e.d military spending by an amoflot greater thp.n the incxeases a t. cun-,ulated .ln the 8 ye.ars of 19'58-1965. _ This ever-i-tic reas.ihg spen.di'ng a.pgears: to ililvo.l v-e eyery major t'ro:n pone:nt of the -i.':r);ned force!?. Tl'le do~nin:a.nt. view ~m.ong Soviet lead~-:v s app~a't" ~ to be that the _ QSSR should~have a w ide-r s .pe.ctrum 0 military -capab~!ities than ate now at-hand. Although the necessity for higher military e~p~r,~di~ures a.ppear,s to be , a;ec~. pted oy all Sectors' 0f the leade'rsl:iip, there may be a shaki-er eQnsensu~ a .s te which, sector of the nationatl. economy will have to ma\s,e t:he c.or::re.s'J)O.tid ing comp~n~ating sacrifices. The leadershi:P appea;;rs t~ have c~ose:n to sacd lice inve,stment in further industrial g.rowt_b. So-me So-viet leaderJ recognize that they a.ll'e thus ri.sking an eventual sl.owdown in economic growth. As higher military costs are translated in_to pogram C\lr.tailment~ and postpone ments> they will add fuel to Kremlin c<:1ntroversy. Past Trends i~1 Military Spending. From the erui of the. Korean War-until . 1965. the long-term tr~nd in total military spendiP,g wa$ ~ne d. {).Q.ly J'-!l'0ti-er ate growth. Since the year after Kh-rushch-ev s ou:ste.r (October 1964), now ever, ~he rise h.as been sharp (c. 1ax:t on page 35}. retweer1 1'9SZ ;;tnq 1965 the pe.rcenta,ge .of GNP allocat-ed to the mUitary actually de~lined. Fro-m 1957 (t ye-ar of minimum tnilita.ry outlays !~r this period) througn 1965, military and space. expenditures grew at an average rate of about io/(' per year, while the economy grew by about So/c p~r year. This trend eoincided closely with Khrusc-bev's pro,gram to change the Soviet miHtal."y e'S'tablisb1nen.t from a p;d~arU.y conventional !g e tq one which .fully encompasa~s the new. military technol.ogy of mi"s ,siles and nuclear weapons. The a:billty of the USSU to :mod~rat.e its military spe-n-ding in the I 950& re~ulted largely from a. decis.ion: to gradua:Uy r~duc.e.l:be arlJ'led .fore~ fro.m about 6 miU'ion men under arms in 1952 toil-steady level. of about 3 million men :rom 1961 to 1965. This reduction was acceptable to politiealleaders during the 1950s, because equipment a~ a,:-mament be.l~g !urnishe.d to the ground forces at the time inoreased their-ca iliti~ in the :f'orm of improved mobility a~d g-reat;.er. f,i.-re po~.r. The large ine;reaS'es, i'l'l. spending on stra tegic !orces was dampened f-i<rst by the-~e reductions ,ad,,. ,alter l'f60, b.y the stability in lower gr~>Ul;ld o:rces co$-ts. (Cha.J"t p~e:SI 38'' 39, and 42.) Anotl,er stabilizing flfotor ~s the i'a:. t~t Uie ~r-ious opti,.a -Cif stra tegic weapQnry did n-ot opet;l Up aU at,. once to th-e USSR.. 't"~eir costs, there fore~ d.i.d noJ all peak in the same y~a With re_ga,rdto the stra-tegic a k mission, f~r example., !frs.t carne the stra:tegic bonlb.er prog-r~m~ of 1953 1'9-57. then the co'tl.~ntrated effort-on de;)?lPying medj>wn-and ediate range missiles during 1958-t96Z., and, since 19c62, the deplo:.yment of IC:SMs. As an .exception, in l955 th.e Soviet budget felt ~e effects o both th bomber deployment program plus heavy expendi~es for aJr-defense !ighters and n.ew sudace-t-o-adr missile&, .Also~ the red~lr<;>n in the gro:und forees was temporarily b.alte.d that ye-ar. The resu.lt was an uncharacteris.tic rise in the military budget :(o.r l955 (ch:art on page 35). The peri.od 1956-1957 .saw sot.<le re't~n<:Mb.efit.; as groqnd forc~:a re(Jue tions we're resumed, and: s:pen.ding on new strategic 'Syst~s r-er:1a.ined at their !orme:r levels. The military budgets for the years 1958 ~hro~gh 19-62 l!Jaw a .st-dY b'Q.t modest g_rowth, as investment in. strategic attack systems climbed rapidly and m1lita'ry and space R&D program.s b~p,n to exercise a greater influence. Stability in strategic-defense spending and slight 'reduction in costs of the general purpose forces. did much to counter.the trend toward greater erxpendi Manpower reduction~ virtually ceased after 1961; since then, the costs or maintaining and operating the forces in being. with their new weapons systems has begun to grow as a factor in the budget. (Chart on page 43.) Military hardware, all this time, w:~s becoming more and mo re expen s:i'lte, Military spending could have risen. mt:fc h more sharply than it did it not been for-the ;fact that Khrushchev, comtnitted to a long-te rm program of econ.omic development, was inclined to bank on a policy of deterrence based on strategic offensive m l.cssiles. Fron1. this standpoint, he was able to justify a reduction in spending on the gene,ral-po.;rpo.s e 'fo:rces, even though mode:rni:z:ing them p.t the s"arrte thT)e. His military strateg;sts, h~wever, hadth~ir r:nisgivings. They be came r-estive abo~t the strategic i.rnba:lan.ce; they did not. believe that they had a credible ~apability-to wag.e a nuclear war (and. win).. and foresaw ,the poss.1bility that t.he next war tnight not st~rt with a s<Urprise nuclear attack. The steady but rnodera;te ris-e in military-expenditures' reached a . peak in 1963. During 19.~4, Khrushchev's last year, they actually declined, and 1n 1'<7.65, the fir'S't budget yea.:r for the Brezhnev-Kqaygixa tearn, they rose back only to: the 1963 leveL The deploy:nent of strategic missilry wa.s d9wnJ the MR BM and IR BM progr,ams having been conipl~teQ, and SAM deployment also slowed. ma:r"kedly during thi-s period; Sinc::e Krushcbev, h.o.wever, milit,ai-y spending has tended to rise sharply w.i-th each budget. The for-mer trerid, under which-military spending... though ris.ing mode-rately, wa$ taking ttp s-i~ghtly reduc:ed prQportions of lhl':': GNP, re:versed its~l(. Inithlly, th.is trend re,sulted from e .fio:rts t:o improve Soviet deter rence. More recently, Soriet concern ha,s broad',en:ed .to encompass the co:m plex possibilities that lo.cal wars, that i:h.1ping.e <!)n the interests of bot~ major pm.vers may ~scalate. . Soviet leaders eviqenUy have r-eap'pras~d the strategic environm ent and t}JeJr relations with the US a,nc1 hav~ concll:lded that further d'etente ~s not likely and that an ,iriiproved milita-ry postur"e is requi-red .during the present period of recurring crises and rising te~s. :ions-. They seem to ,feel that t:ne US has displayed an :increas-ing willingness to undertake initiatives that the USSR muS;f be prepared to counter and tnat <the Soviet Union should have th.e wherewithal to supp-ort initiatives of its own. They believe that the USSR must improve its military pqtential in ways tha.t will reduce the usrs .t:reedom o.f action and give the USSR greater influence ln the international al.ena. Milit-ary apend,ing began its sharp--rise in 1966 with the resumption that year of major ne.w deploym~.nts <:;; both s'trategic att"ack and strategic defens:e equipment. Expenditut'es .Q;r ICBMs..i!) 1967 we-re. double the level of 19.65, while experiditur.es for BAMs and :A 13Ms rose by about 70~. Outlays fbr st;oa tegic rnission.s ad4ed mo-re thaiJ. l. 7 billion rubles t() t}l~ milita.-~y budget dur ing this pe~iod. Outlays for :R&D and spife~ ~ose by fi'e'arly 3..0% dl.lring t 966-19.67, adding a.~othe.r billion ruQlea to tl}e milit~ty bu'rde:n. In other major areas, former spending patterns persisted, The inc.reased sp~nding announce~ :f,or 1968 appears to be ~imed at in creasing the capabilities -of :PQth strategic and theater forces. Although s~me particular requirements may not be perma~ent --such as moves ta strengthen Soviet forc~s near China, Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean, and s~upport for the Arabs --outlays -or similar purposes will probably continue at present levels in the. next few years, if not incr:ease. In other spending cate;sories, pdma:rily new w-eapons. deplo}'ll:lent~ it will take. several years to Complete the major investments in several program-s which aTe now in their e-a.t~l)i' stages. These programs, when :completed, will also require ao,nual app::rop-r.iadons for operMion an:d rrta-intenanee. Prospects in.General. TP.e Soviets are plan~ing ana building their m.ilitary forces with the recognition that nuclear war is possili.le, and they believe that a pu"i::>licize-d and credible ability to wage su ,eh a . war is a neces.~ary condition fbt-averting i:t. 'Tliey will thus c~mtinue stren~th~niag their deterre.ht, both t9 itrease their milita.:r:y pot.ent1al and to reinf-<l>xce t1he world s image o.:f "the iet Uni as a grea,t :gower. At ttb.e. s .a-rne time, gi"l(ing p.roader-c ons!id;~rat~OJl ~:o the ~ot~l ralig~ oi m .ilitary needs and ap.portuni-ties, Soviet leaders now r'ecognize that deterrenc-e a"lone is not ~nough, that other forms of pow;er will also be needed if Soviet .freedom ~f acticn. in wQrlcl affairs is to be expanded and the US's freedom ot ac-tion d~inis. hed. Prospects for Strah~c ic Prog,ram.s. Tbere is evidence t..Jat ~h.e SS-9 and SS-11 ICBM deployrt:'Uint p'l'ogra;m.s continue ~,nd that llle~ stap,ts c;>f S$-lt silos may be extended int.c> 1968. lnciicatigns-a-re' tW~ a new so;i~d-p:r,_op~llant ICBM may be de'ployed s,oon, New Po&ri~-type S1;.1.b!IJlarines -..vill be appe-aring in s ome numqers in coming years, and a system. that; c-ould lead to the deployment of a frac-ti~al-ol"bit boXTihardment system has-been tested ~Succ-essfully.. Air;. defense capabilities wiU almo$t certainly continue t-o be expanded. ABM deployment seer,ns certain to continue, with no readiness on the part o the Soviets to.agree to a freeze; without StJ.ch an ag~eem-ent., the USSR is also al most sure to continue large ?. &D efforts eitn~-7.' to improve th-e Mqseow sy.atem o.r to devel?p a complet~ly new $ystem, eN:en whUe it is c.ompi~ting the de pJ..o_yme:nt at Moscow. . Depl.e;)ym~;mts will C.P!i"tri:b~te to rising -c_os.ts for-S)trateg~c :rnis.siol"ls in the next f.ew y.ea:rs J and tQ 'fhe eoests for operating: ana nnain~l.ni-n'g s~rategic forces ove-r an e~en longer time period. Sovi:~t costs !or equipping a.nd G>per oting strote.g;c attack. and strategic defenoe .fo.ree~ are v:pected to a~ra:ge about 6 bl.lhoo rubles pe-r ye4_r (about $12 bllhon m-terms a: US buymg power). over the Q;~t few y;ea,rs, c,ompa:red with S billion r\J.bles averages for t h e pe-riod Even i f the nt:tme:rical le-vels of tH,!w s trategic weapoQs systems do not expand a -s fast as th,~y have in the past two years, qualitative improvements in U S strategic ta'rc.a~ will ~:r-ess Soviet, leq..iexs to make similar improve-- s; this alone will tend. to ma.intain .reiq.tivelf h~gh spendi.-ng le've~s. At the s ame time, the oper~ting and r'naintenance costs for the system-s n-ow be in,g deployed wiU h~Y.e,. r'ea:ched h:i:gher lev:els a nd will a.lso tend to ke-e p t-otal mili'ta:ry spend:ing {ron;t.dro:ppillg. Pro$p~cts .or Genera1 Purpo.s e Forces. The USSR j ll..() longe r tied to the l)ingle contingency of ge.neral n'U,clear !l.v.ar, is expanding and othe-rwise strength.~ eni~g; its gene ral purpese .foree's, to give them t he potentia.l. {o r responding over a broad sp~cer.urn of p.cis,sibilities in th.~ iu:vthe l'(aoce o! Soviet fo:reign The a>;rmy. nawy, and ai.r ! orce ele.:on;ent.s in these ta.,rees axe lar-ge but <1,re n0~ yet well a.tJ::uctured fQ..r f;uture n..o~nuclear o onfl;i'cts . Molded in. the l~te l950s and eady l~ 60s as a.n acij\mct t.e the miss:ile fol"ces in a l'luclear wa:r , they were mit,.g~ven equal c.ons.J.<lerat!on in b.ud_g:et'il?-'g. Since 19 6.0., the g.en,e, ra~ ptl:z:;.pose .forces.a ,nd ,f:he. c.on'ln"'amd and gelil~ral stippor.t esta.l?li'$:hment ~>il7Ve been supp.orted by :z."elatiye:ly s .table e~pend:it\lres oi about 9 h illiotil rl.lbles lahQu t $ 19 bilh:on) a,nn;'~''~ With tlii.CS; financing., ineneasing n.umbe.rs ot mod-ern w pon,s, such a,s tacticctl mis~iles-. super 13orii:c figl)hrrs, a;nd sulstnl~rin~s we.tJ."e p;ro.cure<!l al),d d~i:)?lQyed. Bu.~ the means :for !11b'Ving men ar.tq, egui,plnent in :meaningful numbers beyond Sov;~et borders a;nd f~r snstain\ing them:there, in extend'e'd opera:tioil'ia; were lacking. ' B'ut now the. force st:lmetu.re, ~. qui.i'ment l evels, ancl; service su.ppo:rt are probably get ting added attention. Tactical. aviation w ill S'on r~ceive equipme'l!;t better su.ited to its rrdss i()il. The natral forces deficiencies i n ileet a ir defens e~ open,-ocean antisubmarin e warfare, and a :mphibious b.per:r.atlons are now beir.~,g corrected. Ao.dQ-itional ail' logistics. su.pport wil~ p.r(D;ba.M;y: t,!le ,,pr.ovidecl tlo im . prov:e 1't1obH~ty <:>:f for;p,e:!? and s:uppl:i.es. . , The cbsts !'lr th:e-s~ improverne:t~ts co\l:lp incr,e&s: $ pe;nd'i~g for general purp o.se forc~s by l i.i>illion o.r n10.r e rubTe.s; pe!' yea:r~ :'fbe J.ull e1)(tent o the in,c'f.r~a. se W~ll depen~ 'nGt only on the levels of c apabi).i,tie-$ ~onght P,ut Oh 'Ul:e ways the. ~orces p:~, a~tually ope: rat~d: in the ye-ars ahead. Costa 'QOUld .be siz1a'ble,if the BSS.R ~e.n'tirt~o:tes to ex-pand its inOuenc;e ~n4 preijence in the M ,ed' iteFratwa,n and M~.dd Ea.s,t; te inc reas;,~ it,s .f~r~e-s i:.:n the Far East an-d aleng the China border, and to 'J:n:qaden its prq;xy .supporit -to .NQrth Vietna..m and to Goromunist...s pon:so~e d 'tl:lflcltary and gp:e .;rrilla m ,ovements .e 1sewher(! in the Prosyects f or R&D and. S~ee. S0vi~.t m ilitary R'&D ptlilg,rarns a.n:d the s~ce eJfort will proba ,bly al!'iO sptb:d rrw:r e money each y ea:r;; }Jv:er the longer te-rm there is som.e pro.spect that the level oi effort in R&D and spa<+e ~aystabi!iz,e, . g imposed a heavy ~a.in on the eyen unde:r E;b.rushe)tev. wheA. but with continued compe-tition in space and in military technolo.gy, this field are unlikely to be reduced si:g:nificant), Proap~ts or tb.e Economy. .Military spendi.n. resources neede-d f-or Soviet ee.ott0mic g,tow.th.: military spending over-aU ex:pel"ienced, t>nl' m .ode.rate increase~,~. was particularly' :rapid in expenditures for advanced .military bardware and for militatoy and ~-pace R&D, which drained humart and material resource- from industrial expansion, thus hampering Khrushchev's efforts to im.prove technology in civilian j,ndustry.. tS-ee page 46.) De--ma-nds were h.eavy on pre... cis ion machiile-build.in.g, electronics, high-purity m etallux.gy. and related r es:surces_, . Ustinov, planning boss fo.r Soviet defense indu,.stry, warned in 1959 'that the d-emands of military programs in these areas wc:>Uld be intense. When the resource:& l\.vailable p:1;o~ed inadequate to meet all the nation's ne.eds, expansion a md modern.:ization a the eivi)ian indust:r~al plant was ham