DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2014-004, document no. 1 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 19, 2016 THE CENTRAL .. INTELLIGENCE . '.AGENCY AND... l'' ::QVERHEAOl!Zl] RECONNAISSANCE :T~e U-~ ah~ OXCART . c~egoryW.::P.E!d1~\\i:~;i1a Warning Notice Jnte~ligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL) National Security Information :unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanciions. Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals NOCONTRACT (NC) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/ consultants . PROP!N (PR) Caution-proprietary information involved ORCON (OC) Dissemination and extraction of informatiorl controlled by originator This information has been authorized for re- 1ease to... WN WN!NTEL...:..lntelligence sources and moth ads involved Classified byl'= Declassify: OADR Derived from multiple sources ." under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g) All material cin this page is Unclassified. Sec1 et NOFORN The Central Intelligence Agency. and Overhead Reconnaissance: . The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 Seeret NOFORN The Central -lntelil:ig.nce~gerlcy. and Overhead Rec()rirYalssance: The U-2 arid OXCARTProgr~ms;.. t9s4~l~:74. Gregory W. Pedlow E. Welie'nbach History Staff Central Intel/ igence Agency Washingtori, D.C. SeGRET. +chapter 1 Sear~hing for a Syst?itt The Air ForcS Sea.rch. for a Ne~ R_econn':lissan~e Aircraft............... 8 Concern About the Danger' :of a Soviet Surprise Attack ............. ; .. 19 The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282............................... 24 The Technological Capabilities Project Three Support the Lockheed +chapte; 2 Developing Funding Arrangements for Project Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight.. ....................................... 61 Initial Testing of tlie C01462740 SECRET Sec1 el NOFORN "Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions .......................:. 82 The Impact of "the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons ................... 84 AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Member's of Congress .............. : .. 88 ')' Chapter 3 U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, .1956-1958 The Deployment of Detachme.nt A to Lakenheat:h ............................... 94 President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights ............................ 96 T_actical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147 .{:chapter 4 The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960 The U-2 and The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170 The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181 Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187 Set1 et NOFORN :'.Chapter 5 U-2 ,Operations After May 1960 U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Cris!s .............................. 199 Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958........................ 211 Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221 Use of Detachment H Aircraft by U~ Pilots .................................... 230 Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H ................................. 237 Use of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238 The End of U-2 Overflights bf Mainland China ............................. 242 Peripheral Missions SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vieinam ............................. 246 Modifiqa!ion of U-2s for Aircraft C~rrier Deployment ........... : ....... 247 Use of Ca.rrier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site ... 249 (leplacement of the Original U-2s With U-2Rs ............................... 253 The Final Years Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities . .'..........................257 . ...Chapter 6 The U-2's Intended Successor; ProjEict <?XCART, 1956-.1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 .................. 260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267 Efforts To Reduce the A-12's Radar Cross Section ............. , .............. 274 SeCI et NOFORN New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's High Speed ............. 279 Selection of a Testing Site for the. OXCART....................................... 283 The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ................."..... 292 Discussions on the OXCART'S Future Employment ........................... 297 First A-12 Deployment: Operation BLACK SHIELD ........... : ................. 304 -$>Chapter 7 Conclusion Participation Impact -of the Overhead ReconnaisSance Program on the CIA........ 321 -0 Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 .......................... 335 ~Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................ 337 '11-Appendix _E: Unmanned Recorinaissance Projects .............................. 339 This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita tive history of the CIA's manned ove.rhead reconnaissance program, which from 1954 to 1974 developed and -Operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program along with other overhead systems that emerged from il, changed the CIA's work and structure in ways that were both revolutionary and permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and Technology in the I~60s, principally to develop and direct reconnais sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in this study. The authors tell an engrossing story. The struggle between the the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART jects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was enormous technofogical success:" its first flight over the USSR in July 1956 made it immediately th~ most important source of intelligence on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed for nevertheless produced a persistent "tension between its program managers and President The program managers, eager for cover age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt ful of the prudence and propriety of invading Soviet airspace, only reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the diplomatic or l!lilitary cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond overhead reconnaissance progra111s. Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA . records and extensive classified interviews of its participants: The authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in formation available nowhere else. Although the story of tlie manned reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno logical challenges and their implications' for inielligence and national policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today. Many people made important ccintributions to the production of Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act U.S.C., section 403g) this volume .. In the History Staff's pre aration of 'the manuscript, Gerald Haines 'did the final revision, a ain demon- .straled her high talent as acopy editor, and provided staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to more members Lhan we can riame from Lhe Publications, Design, and Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic . . Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far.beyond the of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this handsome volume. Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W, Pedlow, who completed it, brought complementary strengths to this work. A veteran of CIA service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began researcli on this study in 1983, when he joined the DC! History Staff on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter viewing, he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member of the DCJ History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized, edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to. be NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly benefited from .both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program.+ l Kenneth. McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff April 1992