Affadavit Yeates

myknowledge,uponmypersonalreviewofinformationavailable CIVILACTION NO. _Defendant AFFIDAVITOFEUGENEF.YEATES 1..I amtheChief,OfficeofPolicy,oftheNational EugeneF.Yeates,beingdulysworn,deposesandsays: UNITED STATESDISTRICTCOURT FOR THEDISTRICTOFCOLUMBIA fromtheplaintifffortheCourt'sincameraconsideration. informationwhichisnotavailableinthepublicrealmand whichspecificallyidentifiestheNSArecordsbeingwithheld requests,insupportoftheAgency'sMotionforSummaryJudgment. CITIZENSAGAINSTUNIDENTIFIED FLYINGOBJECTSSECRECY 2.Isubmitthisaffidavitregardingallrecordsthat havebeen~ocatedbytheBSApursuanttotheplaintiff'sForA Tosupplementthistestimony,Iwillexecuteanadditional affiBavit,classifiedTOPSECRET,toprovidehighlyclassified totheFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA)forNSArecords. tomeinmyofficialcapacity,anduponconclusionsreachedin responsibleforprocessingallinitialrequestsmadepursuant accordancetherewith. Complaintinthiscase.Thestatementshereinarebasedupon StateOfMaryland) CountyOfAnneArundel) SecurityAgency(NSA).AsChief,OfficeofPolicy,I am NATIONALSECURITYAGENCY THEREI.EVANTDOCUMENTS isattachedtotheComplaintasExhibitC.Atrueandcorrect copyisalsoattachedtothisaffidavit~sExhibit1.) areclassifiedintheirentirety,andexemptfromreleaseunder theNSArecordsthathadbeenreferredtothisAgencybyCIA wereexemptfromreleaseunder5U.S.C.S552(b)(1)becausethey Roy R.'Banner,thief,~olictStaff,advisedMr.Gers~enthat~ litigationconcerninginformationpertainingtoUFOs. attorneyofrecordintheCIAlitigation)was thereferralofthedocumentstothisAgency. attorneyfortheplaintiff,PeterA.Gersten filedarequestwithNSAfortheeighteendo ents-inhisown onDecember22,-1978.Inaletterdated'January9,'1979;- locatedbyCIA.TheNSAalsoreceivedtwootherreferralsfrom CIAonDecember4,197BwhichprovidedthreeadditionalNSA.,.-c,~ documents.Subsequentlyby SaucerWatchv.CIA,D.D.C'-17B-859.) 3.ThisAgencyreceivedfourseparatereferrals(described';.:.3 below')fromtheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)concerning'NSA~'~ documentslocatedbythatAgencywhen1twasengagedan FOIA", ,-;,;;t (Ground:.'/:.i'C~: ThefirstwasonNoven;b~'r:':~..", 9,1~7BwhenthisAgencyreceivedcopiesoffifteenAgencydocumen 4.ByletterdatedJanuary29,1979Mr.Gerstenappealed IithedenialofthedocumentsreferredbytheCIA.(Acopy IofthisletterisattachedtotheComplaintasExhibitD.A itrue,andcorrectcopyofthisletter(lessenclosures)isalso IIattachedtothisaffidavitasExhibit2.)On.1arch2"1979 1\theNSAFreedomofInformationAct/PrivacyActAppealsAuthority !affirmedthedenialoftherequestforreleaseoftheinformation 5U.S.C.S552(b)(3)becausetheyareexemptfromrelease by18C.S.C.S798,50U.S.C.S403(d)(3)~ndSection6of I!PublicLaw86-36(50U.S.C.402(note.j'~Acopyofthis~etter Atrue'andcorrectcopy (Acopyofthisletteris thattheinformationisclassifiedin OnFebruary16,1979plaintiffintheinstantcase, onthesamegrounds, itsentiretyandthereforeexemptfromreleaseunder5U.S.C.,:':::~.:J'./~:: isalsoattachedtothisaffidavitasExhibit3.) andSection6ofPublicLaw86-36. attachedtotheComplaintasExhibitE. 5552(b)(1)andthattheinformationisexemptfromreleaseunde '.'. 5U.S.C.s552(b)(3)forthereasonthatotherstatutesprevent,"'.'i,;,.... itsdisclosure,towit:18U.S.C.798,50U.S.C.S403(d)<'3}.F,;i." bycounsel,filedanrcrxrequestwithNSAforalldocum~nts,':'~\.it.i.:',,;', inpossessionorunderthecontrolofNSArelatingtoUFOs:';"~':':',/::':.'~.';.~.~I~{':. andtheUFOphenomena.(Acopyofthisletterisattached,to'::";","'":..:~!;: theComplaintasExhibitF.Acopyisalsoattachedheretoand--:':;5~f(i; deletionsofinformationexemptundertheprovisionsof5 .,::o; :.!,;:;i:~'..,.~I\%' U.S.C.s552(b)(1)and(b)(3)weretakenpriortothatrel~a~e.~;~>};j'~. PlaintiffwasalsoadvisedinthisletterthatotherNSA,:./\ ;.):;~:,I~l documentsexistedbutwereexemptfromreleaseund~r5U,S:C'-".s.:.jc_.~If~; 552(b)(1)becausetheyareclassifiedintheirerrtr r ecyrexempt,:'~;'.' fromreleaseunder5U.S.C.5552(b)(3)becausedisclosureof~ themwasprohibitedby18U"S'C~5798,50U.S.C.5403(d)(.3~;>~'~':J.:.i~l1.. Publl.cLaw86-36;exemptfromd a s c Losur eunder5U.S.C.5':,.'~;;'~';-!:i.;,:~, 552(b)(5)becausetheyareintraagencymemoranda,orletters~..>::;~ff;;. whichwouldnotbeavailablebylawtoapartyotherthan~'~:~':"::i~;J. : agencyinIitigationwiththisAgency;orexemptunder5U.S:';~: i/ ..'. SS2(b)(6)becausetheyaretopersonnelorsimilarfilesthe',0:e ,.:-.~". disclosureofwhichwouldconstituteaclearlyunwarrante~...,.:::~\, :~"~1 ':'>.',:;'':.::, invasinnnfpersonalprivacy.(Acopyofthis1etteris~tt;;;~e;...".~.'.'........ totheComplaintasExhibitG.Atrueandcorrectcopyis:" '>:;j.r~"~;;I,'",,":.:,,_, alsoattachedtothisaffidavitasExhibit5.).TheJan~a~Y;{:.f..:if~,~\:ig.... letteralsoadvisedtheplaintiffthatcertainl.nformatl.on,::.".'':,....pot:: Atotalofseventy-nine Atrueandcorrectcopyisalso (ThefourthandfinalCIAreferral.) (Acopyofthisletterisattachedto AnadditionalNSAdocumentwasreferredtotheNSA'by, letterdatedJanuary23,1980,plaintiff~ppealed S552(b)(3)becausedisclosureofitwasprohibitedby18 THESTATUSANDMISSIONOF NSA 9~NSAwasestablishedbyPresidentialDirectivein isattachedas~xhibit8.) referredtotheoriginatingagency. 8.Finally,aportionofadocumentwhichisrespon:ive.I totheplaintiff'srequestwasrece~tlydeclassifiedandreleased documentswerereferredtovariousagenciesfortheirdirect originatingwithotherFederalagenciesorcomponentswouldbe tocounselfortheplaintiffbyletterdatedSeptember15,1980. theCIAonJuly27,1979. October1952asaseparatelyorganizedAgencywithinthe DepartmentofDefenseunderthedirection,authority,and controloftheSecretaryofDefense,whowasdesignatedbythe PresidentasExecutiveAgentoftheGovernmentforconducting responsetoplaintiff. theComplaintasExhibitK. tionAct/PrivacyActAppealsAuthorityaffirmedthedenial attachedtothisaffidavitasExhibit7.) plaintiff'srequestforreleaseofinformationonthesame thedenialoftheinformationreferredbyCI~andthesubsequent groundsascitedabove. (Atrueandcorrectcopyofthisletterlesstheenclosure replyletterdatedMarch24,1980,theNSAFreedomo~Informa-, referralbyagainadvisingMr.Gerstenthatthisrecordis trueandcorrectcopyofthisletterisattachedasExhibit6.) InaletterdatedDecember19,1979,Mr.Bannerrespondedtothe exemptfromreleaseunder5U.S.C.552(b)(1)becauseitwas denialofhisgeneralFOIA,requestofFebruary:16,1979. classifiedinitsentirety,andexemptfromreleaseunder5 u.S.C.798,50U.S.C.403(d)(3)andPublicLaw86-36. theirrepresentativesarecarried. ofsignalsintelligenceactivities. signalstransmittedonagivendayisvast. forsendingandreceivinginternationalradiocommunicatio .!~.:~.;r_ additiontoorinsteadofitsowngovernmentfacilities.' > r (Internationalradiocommunicationsasusedhereincludes':"<:';:1,',:: communicationspassedatleastinpartbywire.)Thisi :;1:2: theforeigngovernment'suseofthefacilitiesofaninternational communicationscommon-carrierwhichisalsoavailablefo~'~; '~;':~{?HI~ bythepublic.suchcommon-accesscarrierssupplythemeansby"~:;.:;'71 whichmorethanhalftheencrypted.andplaintextradio mt;!:l.~. cationsofforeigngovernments,foreignorganizations,and:": t l~l Itiscommonknowledgethatthetotalvolumeofradio'l Itisalsogen~r~UX.;.;.' knownthatradiotransmissionscanbereceivedbyanyone".:' :::-~:r,{..~:. net"communications.Aforeigngovernmentmayuseothermeans.~ COMIN~reportsandwillbeaddressedsepar~tely. thecommunicationssecurityactivitiesandsignalsintelligen~e;~(~ activitiesoftheUnitedStates.Aprimarysignalsintell~g A~. (S~GINT)missionofNSAistointerceptradiocommunications't senttoorfromforeigngovernmentsinordertoobtainforeign~q~;..~ intelligenceinformationnecessarytothenationaldefense,-~'.~.~-:.:.;:.:. nationalsecurity,ortheconductofforeignaffairs.Th~.:!:'fl!f :~ intelligenceinformationderivedfromtheinterceptoffore1.gn'''':J>01 communicationsiscalledcommunicationsintelligence.(COMINT): \! OftheNSArecordsatissueinthiscase,onlyfourarenot . remainingrecordssoughtinthiscivilactionaretheproduct(~,~.~ 10.TheseCOMINTactivitiesincludethe.targetingof. :;~:~7t~I?:: foreigngovernments'communicationsbothwithintheirborders.:--:? ...:-:: andtoandfromcommunicantsabroadinvolvingtheuseoftheir.: :.:::-~ ownradiotransmitterandreceiverfacilitiesnotavailablefor''':{';: publicuse.Suchcommunicationslinksareknownasagovernme'nt.-:~1~ that"governmentwouldbeexpectedtotakeimmediatestepsto'~)"',7:',''';~ defeatthatcapability.Thiscanbeaccomplishedinanumber.iJ; ':':d ofways.Aforeigngovernmentmightshifttocommunications.::;rr.:;.: isaprima~ymissionoftheNSA. communicationsisgenerallyknown. withanyreasonableamountofpersonnelandequipment. so,too,a s~tnownto.....f1:~*"':. foreignoffici.'sthatsuch.interceptionofradiocommunica. .~.~;J"t~.I.;.,..;.::..'J..::..;-. Foreignofficialsmaybe':'.;:~H~.,:fi expectedtoknow,~lso,thatNSAcannotpossiblyintercepteV :~f';,:;&'~':. asignificantpercentageofallsuchcommunications,espeCiaIIY.~:~:~ takingaccountofthefactthatNSA'sactivitiesinvolve:.:<~: .::~;:\~ worldwidecommunications,notsolelythosehavingaUnited.'.:::;)).,j~ Statesterminal.Thenumberissimplytoovasttobehandled";;S:'~j! Moreover~:'::~ thecostandeffortofsuchinterceptionwouldbedisproportiori~1: presumablyknowwell'--NSAmustfocusitsinterceptionactivi-.;, .,:,-::~ .tiesonthoseparticularcommunicationslines,-channels,links'.J~'.;~1 orsystemswhichyieldthehighestproportionofusefulforeigri: :~t intelligenceinformation.Whatforeigngovernmentofficial~}:.;~.:.;-=:t~ notknow,however,iswhichofthevastnumbe~ofradiocommun.~:~I"(:: cationsNSAattemptstointercept,whichareintercepted,and,',' I!ofthosethatareintercepted,whichyield.toNSAprocesSing.:-,<~.::.) .1methodsandtechniques.Itistheprotectionofthiscritical,.~:.:';': ;,[r"informationthatisattheheartoftheinstant~ase.,:,:.);;~t~::i1 li!13.ThecontinuedefficacyofNSA' svital~ntell~g C~,;./:t$3:'~i~{ activitiesrequiresthatthelines,channels,linksandsystems-;~'i':'; IIactuallymonitoredremain identified.jfaforeigngO~:~'~i;~i~ij \1obtainssuffic"fe'ntreasontosuspectthatNSAisableto'<~'.t i:: interceptandprocessthatgovernment'sradiocommunications,''.:: .~.: interest.ThemannerinwhichNSAdoesthisselectionandthe sourceislostunlessanduntilNSAcanestablishanewand InformationaboutthesesubjectsbeenreleasedtothepUblic. wouldenableforeignobserverstofurtherassess,andthustake 15.Evenaftertargetingonlyasmallproportionof aboutwhichvirtuallynoauthoritativeinformationhasever tothenationalsecuritybutalsoimposeaheavyburdenonthe toestablisha newandequivalentinterceptandthesourceis communicationchannelbelievedtobetargetedbyNSAcan maypossessthetechnicalcapabilitytoeitherupgradeor interceptionoperation,alloftheintelligencefromtha~ equivalentintercept.Theriskinvolvedisgreat.Theinfor- initiatecryptographytosecureitscommunications.Finally,a linkstheU.S.cannotintercept.Itmayalsochoosetouse alternatemethodsofcommunications.Theforeigngovernments limitedresourcesofNSAwhichmustattempttorecovertheold thusisfacedwithaconsiderabletaskinselectingoutthose messagesthatwillbereviewedforpos~ibleintelligence. theSecretaryofDefense,theSecretaryofStateandother policymakers.Obviously,ifa~OMINTsourceusedbytheAgency becomesunavailable,policymaketsmustoperatewithoutthe. informationthatsourceproduced.Sometimesitisimpossible mationproducedbyNSAincludespolitical,economic,scientific andmilitarydatawhichisofim~easurablevaluetothePresiden~ degreeofreliabilityandsuccessitsmethodsenjoyareSUbjects lostpermanently.Thoselossesarenotonlyextremelyharmful allavailableelectromagneticcommunicationsforinterception, thenumberofn~ssagesinterceptedisextremelylarge.NSA sourceorestablishanequivalentsourceofinformation. 'beusedbyaforeigngovernmenttopassmisleadinginformation. 14.Ifaforeignpowerissuccessfulindefeatingan .ZWUUU.C2JSJ; 52iU.ibU&I.e inferencesandmakeassessmentsaboutthisnation'sCOMINT takecounter-measures,asdescribedabove,todefeatthe themwould'permitforeignintelligen~eofficialstodraw collectionandprocessingactivitiesthatwouldenablethemto RELEASE OFCOMINTREPORTS COMINTreportsbeingwithheldfromtheplaintiff channels,links,andsys~emstargetedandinterceptedandNSA's capa~ilitiestosuccessfullyprocesstheunderlyingcommunica-I tions.Thesecommunicationstargetsandtheprocessingtechniques! are,currentintelligencesourcesandmethods. Disclosing.." gencepurposes.Nomeaningfulportionofanyoftherecords couldbesegregatedandreleasedWithout~entifYingthe communicationsunderlyingthecommunicationsintelligence repo jAlsodisclosedwouldbethecommunicationslines, classificationtoinformation,theunauthorizeddisclosureof whichcouldres~ltinexceptionallygravedamagetothenation, 17.TheCOMINTreportsbeingwithheldfromtheplaintiff suchas,thecompromiseofintelligenceoperations vital'tothenationaldefense.Otherdocumentswereproperly classifiedSecretpursuanttoExecutiveOrder10501,Section sourcesandmethods.Whenoriginated,certainoftherecosds wereproperlyclassifiedTopSecretpursuanttoExecutiveOrder 10501,Sectionlea),providingIfortheapplicationofthat capabilitiesofNSA'sintelligencegatheringtechniques. disclosureoftheserecordswouldidentifythecommunications stepstodefeat,thecapabilitiesofNSA'sintelligencegathering l(b),providingfortheapplicationofthatclassificationto ,information,theunauthorized1isclosureofwhichcouldresultin Ithathadbeensuccessfullyinterceptedandprocessedforintelli- areallbasedoninterceptedforeigncommunications.The ;jtechniques. forclassificationinSection1-3ofExecutiveOrder12065,and EachCOMINTrecordwasappropriatelymarkedwhenitwasorigi- ThesecOMINTrecordsmeetthecriteria EachcOMINTrecordandeachportionthereofremains informationrevealingimportantintelligenceoperations." seriousdamagetothenation,suchasby"compromising lCA),providingfortheapplicationofthatclassificationto classifiedbecauseofthedamagetheirunauthorizeddisclos~re... wouldreasonablybeexpectedtocausetocommunicationsin~elli~,~,~ genceactivitiesoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.Becausethey..:.:: ':~.0:;1 areproperlyclassifiedund:rExecutiveOrder12065.the;~? l! classifiedTOpSecretpursuanttoExecutiveOrder11652,Section rest,whichwereoriginatedafterJune1,1972,wereproperly information,thedisclosureofwhichcouldresuI~inexceptionally theyareproperlyclassified'dthinthecategoriesprovided-'- inSection1-1oftheOrder.IhavereviewedalloftheCOMIN;.I recordsbeingwithheldfromtheplaintiffforpossibledeclassi- properlysoclassified. Inconductingthis':~: .';:.~ review,Iweighedthesignificantne~dforopennessingovernmen~ againstthelikelihoodofdamagetoournationalsecurityat.~cf'f:i(.' thistimeanddeterminedthattherecordsshouldcontinuetobe,,':..;.; classificationtoinformation,theunauthorizeddisclosure 3-1and3-3ofExecutiveOrder12065andIfindeachportionof,~ eachrecordremainsproperlyclassifiedandtheteforeexclu~.e,~.",.:~. ficationordowngradingaccordingtotheprovisionsofSections 11652,'SectionI(B),providingfortheapplicationofthat fromdeclassificationordowngrading. whichcouldresultinseriousdamagetothenationalsecurity,,I sucfi~stherevelationofsignificantintelligenceoperations. PublicLaw86-36,18U.S.C.798,andbySection103{d)(3)of .,recordsareexemptfromdisclosurepursuantto5U.S.C.552(b)(1)'.: Publicdisclo- Accordingly,itwasdetermined (Seeparagraphs11through15above.) ~ele~seoftheCOMINTrecordsbeingwithheldfrom thatwouldbeseriouslyjeopardizedbythedisclosureplaintiff thereportsthatidentifytheintelligencesourcesandmethods tivecontentofthedocumentsbutalsoonthecharacteristicsof exemptions(b) (1)and(b)(3)arenotbasedonlyonthesubstan- itsfunctionsandtherebyjeopardizeth