DEPARTMENT FormS, 11 (Revised Feb., 1960) FILE DISPOS.4L SYTE\ "1-trl,tCHI n,, A ftC' M.INU I t:. :lHt:.t:. I 1 . Reference minute 1 enclosures 15A to 15N. Action has been taken by Head1uarters, Home Command (enclosure 12A on file 201/8/211 refers) to request the r .LG. to provide t.-.e following permanent lines for the Sector Operation Centre at Ric hmond. (a) Two private lines from Richmond to Georges reight Radar Station te;;rminating on the .. D. F. a t Richmond Sector Operation Centre. (b) Two y.rivate lines from Richmond to I'Tilliamtown terminating on Jr,. D .F. a t Richmond Sector Operation Centre. (o) Two lines from Richmond Sector Operation to No. 1 Radar Site Richmond. d) An extension to Richmond r .. P.~. from Ho. 1 Radar Site Richmond. above action has been taken a~ <J. result of tie co~unication recuirements shown on Dwb. RS.1508, file TEL.EPHONE: BO'"~Otl IN Rt PLEASE QUOTE 1): cretar. , Pe'li'lth, J lle1 South ::. A lr Board, Victoria Barrac'.s, elbourne. S . C .l. Vtctoria. AD. DEFENCE EXERCTS.!:i 1. It is nesirod to submit for your information a rerort on the 1\ ir D "lee Bxerci.se FlyL'1"' Saucer" which '~as ~eld on 20th an 21st ,Tune, 1953. The exercise was de~t~ned to exercise No. 22 (City 0f Sydney) (F) 3~uadron, o. 23 (Ctty o"' Prisba'1e) (F) S~padrr-n, !Jo. 2(F) C :: . U. and t' S dney lr D f ~c ~raini'1 Sector 1~ their o -rattc"lal 2 . '.i.'h s wa., t .e :irst occasion on ~ t 1e 3 ctor eratio"ls Sector as used tn its srm:ue--_,.ition at icl. ond. T ere \>Ia a rtat deal of work to bs d e -1.. a relatively short time ana the etithusiasm of tne Sector erson'lel i"l their al'. roach to the tas' .:s to be co:"'mended. "'.t.lis a t -fir:;t tine, '!;oo, i 1 'hich t e modern t chni ues o~ rai rer.orti a and c ntr.:lli'1e, .rairi d's,~:lay, laques and more suit ble Ge'leral Situation i"a. were e!.lployed. As l-Ias to be e:>q:.ected, the res ttl ts achieved were !IIUC.'l better than 3. Because of the inexperience 0f mcst of t .e r.ersonnel, 'lelays o~curr"'d in raid "'1for'1ation ap!earng en .... o .s:. Ge'1el'aily sr eakinr these delays -.Jere Jf the orc"er of four ~'1u~e~. -1 0 ... 1er nsta~ces delays wer~ c 1sed ~y f . f . I . re<Jdel'!' tendi.np to c 1cent:rate 0'1 one raid t the exclusion o4" nll others. HO\Iever, \her~:~ t~'l.e .l. r.I. reader llnd he oircra ~... latter were eyperienced, the results ach ':e ved were of a very hi~"l order. 4 . On s ver<>l occasio'1s when a trac' 1assed into the cover'! , an adjr.cent l'3dar, n<.fficulty wa'3 expert need in kn ~in..,. bich lot er 1as responsible for the track co cezned. s difr:l.culty coul ne obviated by numberin t e arro,~s nccor tn to t e ~l?tttn~ rosition. unic t:ton5. !:lirect telepho lE."S bac'c by Hirjl uency circuit 1ere made available bet eeu the o ct r '1d ononts of the ra~d re ortinr-and co troll:nt '"hese roved success 1, but it s obvtou that lt es are e-ser-t~a~, ~ther1ise ther s a a "nistrative detail necessary beroro ev n c '1 be C3de available. o . In future exercise-i~ ts rro. sed to all~ eve1 re t ct'c 1 freedo by de : naving a tRr et, P~d a ~ininun run in i~t nee. 0~ rea~n t !s oint att~c t a~rcrart ~ould be c~ ~itte t thP attac., but until then may c rry out spoof r<~id , s~lit trac ( ~l:'ing and other methods to confuse the defences. In addition to providing opportunities for tactical raid lanl'li~g, ore complicated raid ~dentific tion roblems ill s:::-~se. be"'e ts Dec us ~f t ~ shorta"e of tr ined TUnner , t e full f this operrlt L n '~ere "lOt g~ined. ei ht fi~din-rad revious exerci~es, it is a 'n erormnnce r dDr be Ire- it ... jet aircrHft coul only v a mhe Controller' dia bP. de mor sound-proof. T e~dices ore a ~ac ed - A" -Details 'Jf 1'l'"erce t~ ns -r ~rcup Ca tai 1 ~or .ir CfPtcer Co and' ~ Beaufi hter 1 DE':CAIL~ F INTERCEfT!ONS PIIASF 1 SATURDAY 20TH JunE 1953 Ingleburn Camp Cataract Reservoir Scnof1eJns & Cataract P.e serv:>ir Yo.:ls B1acktol n 'qaih1ay S tn. ~lyde :8npineerin" 'orl<s Line J n -r bably d~s tr yed " b mbin" run. Mission ~uccessful Intercepted on Cataract ~ar et, nil n Jch lelds wissL n success.:u.1.. Evasiv~ Acti n Lt ln d str d Ha kesbrtry Er1d f' Ye'3 I 1 leburn C ar.tp l I'lgJeburn Camri y~ 1 I l. '1C ln cle~tr S CE TRE ( .o.c . ) OP ERI<TIC!I FLWIG SA.UCER REPORl' ~OO:OND SECl'OR OPE:tli-TIONS le All operation bearing the eode name Flying Saucer" ~.e.s held on 20th and 21st June, 1953, to exercise the Air Defence Orgsn1snt1on of Sydnay. "!, D.u-1118 the exercise the Officer Commanding the Richmond Sect or Operations Oentre acted a s an observer 1n the Operations RoO!ll end a t the Richmond 'baaed radars. ~TWilo AND aEPORl'ING ORGANISA.TION 3, Overall tactica l control of i'ighter s and anti aircraft artillery e: ~llts was exercised from the ru. ' unond Sector Operations IJentre. 4 . In order to obtain the maximwn BlllOunt of early warning coverage tor t he defended area and to provide G.c.l facilities, four rada r units wor e employed, viz (a) WilUamtown -ono L1IM1Il -raid report i ll I G. c.-\ (b) Georges !Ieights -one LWIATJH -reid reporting I o . c , l (c) Richmond -one U'liA' I -rai d r eporting (d) Port Kemble -one J.Nr/PS3 -raid reporting 5. It had been planned to UBe the ClJH radars a t Richmond end Williw:xtown but inability to obtain v:ave guides in time negativated t he use of this equtp- ment. It was .oecessary, therefore, to give the heights on raids as they appeared on the General Situation l!ap. 6. As there wa s insuft1cien~ personnel to nan both the LVIIAW and the ANT/PS~ at Richmond, it was decided to use the former equipllBnt because or 1ts s uperior pertormnnce. However, during the course of the exercise it was possible to man ~he ~friPS3 to a limited extent for the purpose ot making a comparison between the perfo:rmanoe of the two equ1pments. 7 . A continuous flow of 1ni'o:rmation was received from all radars with the exception of the Port Kemble equipment. Thi s radar ~ve intermittent service on the Saturday a nd on the following day became oompl etiy u.nservice&bl.e . s. The oontrol and reporting organisation was manned by P/l. .F. member s and the Activo Reserve Element of the ru..chmond Sector Operation s Contra, assi.sted by .H.cti ve Reservists of tro. 114 MFaJ and the Wagga Radar Unit. 9 , The Staf f Otfioe r Operations and the staff Officer Air Def onco of Headquarters East~rn Area acted as Se:tor Commander and GCl Controller, ooorgos Heights, respectively. Plight Lieutenant Granvil~e aoted Gal Controller a t wnua mtown. 10. Tho hctive Res erve Element of tho Sector Operoti ons contra oomnonoed a tourte~n day camp a week prior to the exercise and renderud valu~ble nsaistnnoo towards compl etion of tho Opernt1ons Room organ.l&ation. ll. The eenural stnndllrd of ef ficiency displayed by the hot 1vu nus.,rve Element throughout the exercise 1'158 ex:tre!tlel y good, particulnrly vlh<~n 1 t 18 considered thl:>t, a s Y'Jt, thuy have received prA.Ci:~o.~':l no ut: 'otivo training lll. As tho LW/A'il 'he.s an i< ;;::.ope dl.sp~ay xeid 1nt'ormnt1on trom ~.his eou.r'.le ..,ed via a conversion 'i'U!:!le to t.ce Oenerol Si'tuotion Map, In the cuse of th9 othe:-ze.dars lt woe JY' "'d ~ ~x-ect fro!ll tho PPl Tube. 13. .d.l~"'ri"'G was no. r.&c~.:;so.ry as all rodars v;ere of tho beal!led t.ypeo nuplicatioo of tracks was el.!.m~.na'l;ed by supprel"s1on oc "unwanted infor V.t1ou,tt 14. Due to the inexperJ.cace of :nost of the personnel de'!.a;,o 1n presentation of the ini'o=r.lllt'.o!l were appa!ei:t. The ,JOrst t!lne lags amc-...:tted to approx ~tely tour .:rln~\tvs 1.o the case of infor=tion ::::-eceived from the LU/AVI. These particula r delays were t:.ndoubteclly caused a t the Conv<J::::'slon Table. In other instanoeo the y ware cue to the PPl O't>ao.)l"Vsr tondin~ to ccn!)e.o.trate or. one raid to too ~elusion of all ot~ers. OptiJ:IUlll re3ult s were obtained 1'!'01!1 r.!le Georges Heights radar as both t.'le PPl ObSdr\er and t he Aircraft Plotter were fully experienced, ~"' o .'l. reduction in tillle '..ags a.c.d 1:1 rr.arke1 increase 1ll the aocuraoy of plotting tocasne t$V1den l; on the seeond dtly. J.6. On several ocoasiou~ when a track pasDad into the c;ovexege of all adjacent xodar, the .dl.oor SUjlerviso:r exper1.enoed some d!.fficulty in !c.now1ng whioh p},otter was reopollllible for the track ooncernado It ia considered tha t this diff1('ult:f' would be obviated if the <~rro?te we:e nll!:lbered 1n accordance to the plotting p<'>~.t-t>.;ls to which they are allotted. :7, 'Ihe plotting equipment v&s ~nufactured e.o." oly by unit l&bou= and on ~he Whole g&ve :atisfac -~ results, J.ll displays wera oaslly read:t ble, e:eep~ fo:o:> certai n identity colours. 18, Lack of suitable equipment rendered it impossible to display identity am serial on !hid :l>isplay Stw ~ ill the c..anner laid dmm 1n Control and ::leporting Procedure No. 3/53. ~9. The me"-hod adopted' for displaying th1.s information was based on the system at present 1n force in the Control and Reporting SystEI!ll in the United Kingdo.o 1iheN t~e aerial and identity are displayed eeparate17. 20. This procedure appears to have the following t~.dvantages over tbl combined identity Je r1Ell method t t n) A e:maller numb ... r ot displAy counters are re ,:.~red for ooch plot-ting (b) The plotting xeto is i.ocreased as less handling of thu display ~o "3 is requi!.'ed to make the 1ni-,;1al presentation o:-subseqc.ently a changv 1n (c) sto.ra~e of display counters is ~,;re&tly s inplified. '1'. l'E DISP.LI-y 21. Lack of suitable di9play oountera restricted the 1nf~mat1on that oould bo s: "''lin the "Mission Collllllll~. &part fl'Dm this det1o1unoy, the 1nforcstion provided wns adequate f o r the purpose or the 4Xeroise. 22. Some contusion existed at times as to the colours allotted to the Sections. On severul occasions 1n becoming airborne, the Section Leader used n colour whicn s different frora t-hat shown agt1ost hio section on the 'll te. It hts been detei'!llL"lOd that in moat instances, the col~'.I' \I Sed 1Jl e rror ,o;es one which hnd been Allotted to & Section ho had manned SRrl1or 1n the dny, 2:;, :a 1c concluded that the basi:: ca~se or th1s contusion v.as the procedure Of' allotting colo= to t h9 :;ctions as soon as tlloy appeared ::1 t.h3 T te as being operotional, 24. It is considered that in f~ture colours ohould be passed t o the ~ctions by Squadron Operations F.o~:s l'lhen implementing scrambling orders, and not before. Thus the 'I~'Je will only display lOtion .olours in the liumber Airborne CalWilllo 25. A tanporery AA ::lis!,).ay Board was erected by the kJI,y j~s'j prlor to the ca:nmencEll!lent of the exercise. :a i.s con3idered that when a permanent board is provided display:l.ng the coastline and an outline or the GWl Defended Area, the task or identifying the gl:ll state in a particular s ection will be greatly s:.:nplified. L:OVRillHT L.VI.!SCN SECTiON 20. An Active Reserve officer vss stationed at the Aircraft ~ntrol Centre, ~&;at, for the duration of the exercise and passed a1r::raft movement information via a direct P.~.G. line to the Movament L~aison officer. 27. AU 1.hc>j It <;he flow of ,illformation was well ma.11lta1ned were several insw.nces where the t!mes received were definitely stale. TC.ia was undoubtedly due to the inexperience of the officer at ~scot. 26. As an accurate pes1tion report is one of the factors considered when establishing the identity or a track, it is unfo=tunate that the information came thro1J8}l in the form of E.T.A' s . There v;as insuffic!.ent tii:le available to organise and tra!.n the personnel concerned and consequently t~ere waa no alterXll!tive but to permit the.rn to operate the procedures that were in force during previous exercises. 29. Eltcollent scramble times were achieved -in most cases the sections becoming airborne thin three minutes of the order being given .WL!UlUCATION~ ~. Direct telephone lines wertt made availablo betw<>en the Richmond Sector Operations Cet:tre and : (a) Raid Report\ng Units (b) G..C.l . ElonLoots (c) S<;_usd::-on Operation Rooms, and (d) Aircraft Control Centre , Mascot. 31. H/F radio tele-phone b.cking was provided but. was no~ ::-equired as aJ..:_ telephone linus (;fl7e most aatisfac 7 aer e throughout the exercise, 32. As the .11\llllber of telephone lines thati could be mLde avallable was limited, a direct line could not be established between the T ~e aud Squadron Opel"ltion Rooms. Consequently, confL""!Dati n o:: a ircraft states and inforrnati~ covering nUI!Iber of aircreft clrborne, Bi::bo:-ne a. d landed tirlas .nad w bo pees d back to the 'I~:.e via the l:'eputy Co1.trollor Grounl. Til's proc(!d\!re 1s most unsatiefactory sa it greatly incransec,t tl\v work t> tho Depul;y Cor crol.1.<or Grouldr and often r~sultfld 1.n -;htJ late pra::JOP-' .atior: of a JSe'!t!:Q 1.1f, . ..-' t::.oc. 33. ?he star:.derd h~ndset 'type telept :m"'s that '' .re ~s <i ora .!lOt ,u! t .t-: " tor o,.urations Rcc.uc or t:.1e noturo er "ho t a l l b G".ls l'fl1se o uo~ :;e t'ncto..:- to Eln unae ~b.le l.av1.1l . A swi';ch sel~ction box ln-:orpo:ca~. cau e.r.d v.arning ~tet:s .:(Juld n-;.lj only eHmioate this !actor but would red!;.<Je the ~'J.c~r ::.f ~nstr.l.-:ez:ts ro:?,vircd for intez--.unit commu..'liC!Ition t:> oc.a per 'balcc~:; posi'=Jon. 34. The general standa=d of efficiency of tte ~;e=at!o~G ~Jon personnel was superior to that obtaining in ear lie:-w~e::-;:ises. :::a s ;;as pa::-tly ,. ~oc1lt rf er ''9r ;e and partly dt:.e to :!.r-provcd facll4t13s. 35. The excel..:.dnt service provided by the .'l'lnd l~ ces 1as !! n::!jO!' c:Jntri- but!on towards the success of the exe~c~se. 35. It is desired to specially mon~ion the servl.ces Nndered by the Ac,;ive Reser7s Signals officer, Flit;;lrt L:i.e\l.tenant k.A. Gamp'be.ll. 1'lJ.o.r.e 1s no question that the skill and untir.l..ng effori;s oft this office:-were lare;ely responsible for the excellent results 0btained from the S,ignals o~n s<~-1:::\un, 'J7. The .noise level 1tl the ::>pel.'ations Room was tar too high at an t:l.rnes. r-c feci mlin(y by t;~ ephone bells and u.o.avoidably b;r pe:!'SOT!ne~l ronn~.ng the balcony. To a lesser e:r.tent the General Sitn.ation !.tap crew were also respor.!l:lbla. 38. The poor p~rrormance of the ANT/PS3 r~dar at P.iahmond renders thjs '3qu1pment most unsuitable for GC.l purposes, ~C!.ll.!ENDATIONS 39, It is recoQme~ed that : (u) In future exerciaee, a direct l:!..l1'3 ~e estsbli3hed between the':~.:..:: and each E~uadron Operations Rona. (b) The upp<Jr 'Jalcony j.:1 t~e Cpera.tions E.oo::t be ~aeae<! 1:1 !l.lld :~ door be located at the entrance at ,;he tcp of the S';oi~y. a switch eelection box ~.Iicorporating ~11 und :r:~rn!.ng ::..ighte be provided for each telepholl.S position 1.n 'wht> O!><>::'Ot .. :J.:::s P.oom a.lld ln Raid Reporting o:-GCl Gabi:l;:;. The L~l/k'.'Tii. :adar at Geo!'gea Hei~ts be ~.:.aed fiJr ~o~il oper.:tional and traitli.nl; purposes :tn l1,e1 of ';;he Ri:;hLlond ba'3ed .4.;.\",'/?53 a:J~uip The CMH radar at P.:i,.chmond 'be re-sited at Gcorees Hci1~1;a an comp~.< 'lentar,y equipment t-o the .:~1/f'>.'VH .ro.do.t'. F..:.igh'li Li..,; UttJ!lllnt Offi~er ca~d1.ne Richmond S!..ctor Operuti.ons c.:mtl'U THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BAOL Y FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE. SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY. gcmro/.A} :rn l'l.Z Aut'li''AJ T!,. I.ft . pl. ClUOte !f .. cJquarter~, F.lllte1'1'1 Ana rfll!ITJ! tf,S.~l. ROLIJ, AUS'mALIAN AIR ra.CJ, }lo.82 (B) Wins, /ll"!l~Lrt. ...... -Conoetration '1'1 ... on 'l'Vpt. "B -Pbot()Mlph!G B0111:>1ng F.eeulte.{o~t,.>~.d ~v.ly) IptrMuqtlqp. 1. In aooordant'e ntb Roadqu.artere, 1-:tlet.nl r.z..-C:peratloa Order lio. S/53, Jlo.82 (B) 'll1.q provideCI 11 force f1l au U.noolna to carry out eilll).atfld bocibinr, c.ttoc:ks asawt elected uraot ln the f:Jdnef Area on the 20th and 2:t.t June, 1953. A total ot twenty-tour atteokl were carried out ~& detailo~ in for~ Creen i .. ued by l!eaclquartera, Eaatern flrec, each atror!lft cocpleU.as t1I'O 1r.<'1rl :lll attack!! aptr.at t.Argete on lloth da}'lt of the 2. The J!UTPOie ct this exGrciaa wae to exerohe t>te A1r letanco Or~n!5ot!cn of SJdnor. lrilfing nl Pbricting. 3. All airGTew at+.end_, a Qnoral llrietirls prior to the nart ot tl'le open.Uctt. a addition a deti!Ued ltrl.etinc Fora waa pYttn to crew fct1 each individual ecn-tie. A, At the oo ple\iot~ or euh ortie tho orev debrieteci l:y i.hn WillE Catesaryl.-d.ere anrl :i:ntelligence Officer, end the Fom Jlll:le d11]1Catolled to lieadquartore, EaetG1'1'1 AT ... 5. hqtntme pM :.sda Uef!(\, )lerlptnre were briefed to OlltTY out the ox.ro1o Uflil18 all availAble aiel. 'l'he :!diu Ulla Wll to be -.cia of ft28 ,_nioulVl)' f:roa l't, JlaoqutJ'1a Datu11 'hrce~. In the eYent of R~ failure cww i.hte area, naviptore ere to rn.-. to D.R. naYSp"inn uc~ wltt-4rlft wind. Ai.rareft ra to IJT1Ye at Datru within:. 5 lllinutea ct oonoentreUcm tt.ee, and at t.be tarset. on ooncetration U111. 6. Cmpentrats,s:n UMJ. Tho route oelecrttld tr~ l't, Jaloquarte - Datu.Targri, toge\h11r with the biltl eentobU1ty ot 112%j llaTlptore tc plan tor a htsb aoCNTao,-ot oonoontra'tton t1111t Ob t.ara.t. Oil ~et.a11 wl'lere Jl~ 111111 ~.rrioea'ble aoourate crouDII tpeecl otleeD were obtained by vieu.l beltrinc-m t)le ooaet line. tl.-nsr, et.owr. at AJ.petldlx " ... , tt eqoeotad eocurecy r.ot eohinl!4. ll7.N1tnat1m of the non..,.tim loc-, tognhor "ith the intoraats.cm cl:'\elinotd at de-'bril'f1.nl!, revo11led tttlll"'l in uc t see11, t)le 1n oocureo1011 tn oonoentraUon Ul'lel! oan l>o attributed to prolonge f1R)!ter att1HaUm. llurtnr; the rull in frol'll Dttua, Unoolne wre interceJited IIJl to 1'7 ld.n&&tea prior to E.'l'.A. taT_set, aft(l rtC}Itw atflUaUm (Ill THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE. ".,..... SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILTY. OG!IIts-.4 1111&11 .tter tho belli nleMD J1QI.J:lt _. ,.. u .. 1CIINIIa fll u ,,-_. u tlw .-.. as -.,cp~s *"Mb aa.,..tara dtcp\e4 to