./ Ref'. your M. 9 . I have discussed tho papc.r~oosely enclose~ 11i ~h l'lr. Turner and have told him that my views on tho subject of UFOo,rrom a scientific intelligence point of vi ,a~ as follows: (a) The present establishment of DSTI ~ ~ been designed to ~eet the research demands arising f rom our 3tudie3 of defence science in countries in the Far East and South East Asia, and to keep abreast of major dovelopmento in defence science ~February 1970 JIB (M) FILE MINUTE SHEET (FRONT) M.10 (contd) in the Soviet bloc. There is no surplus research capacity within the establishment th~ t could be diverted to problems such as the investigntion of UFO reports. _r am not convince~at ther~ is a suf!icient scientific intelligence component in the UFO pro~lam suc warrant ~y diversion of Australia' s very limited resources for scianZ intalligenc~ research. It is evident; that there is still considerable controversy concerning UFOs and this will un- doubtedly QO e until the subject is fully Mmutes to be wrrtten neatly in Ink or typewritten and to be dated and s1gned by officers over their pos1tion or rank. examined by some competent authority. Such an examinatian..,_how..ave:c_, wottld require a considerable effort to collect information on UFO sightinga, to investigate repo~ts of such sightings and to examine all information in an objective, scientific r, ~ l 'unu No. lU Introduced Ma)', 1966 ,DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE S ubsequent correspondence ha~ been placed on DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE MINUTE PAPER REFERENCE: SCIEUTIPIC AilD INTELLIGBUCE ASPECTS OF THE UPO PROBLE!~ The two documents attached are intended to focus on aspecto of the UFO problem that have tended to remain hidden. The report dealing with the US attitude has been compiled froc official repor~s and statements made by the CIA, US Air Force, Congressional Hcaringo and Project Blue Book records. The second document dealo with evidence for weapon oystoma used by UFO' s . Thia evidence has been culled from computerised records collected by Dr Vallee in collaboration with Dr liynek at North-Weotorn University and represents only a ract~on o. orld-wide reports dealing with the same ~capon syswems. Australia has h~d its share of this kind of reporting. 2 . IntelliBence aspects include assessment of real from falao reporting, capabilitieo of propulsion methods and possible weapons used, motivetion of opcr6tions (barmfu! or n o t , defensive, of:cnsive, scientific etc. ) for both short- term and long-term and whether thoro are QOre effective ways to detect theae operations or defend them if necessary. (O. H. TURNER) Hd. Nuclear Branch The ca.rly analyses of UFO repor-i,s by USAF intelligence indicated that real phenomena were being reported which had f light charact ;stic~ ~o far in advance of U. S . aircraft that only an extra-i~rr~sti~l orig)n coule be envisaged. A government agency~ which l&:t.:n-c.puts indicated to be the CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), studied the UFO rep~rt~ with the intention of det~rmim.6 t:l~ UFO propulsion methods. At that i.ime, OS! was esponsiblo for intelligence on foreign research and development in nuclear and missile matters. The CIA b~came alarmed at the overloading of military communicRtions during t~e mass sigbtings of 1952 and considered the possibility that the USSR may take ad.,.o.ntage of such a situa~ic;u. As a result, OS! ~cting through the Robertson-panel meetir.g of mid-Januar.r 1953, persuaded the USAP to usc Project BLUE BOOK as a means cf rJublicly debu~.<kin~ UFO' s , and at a later stage to allccc.te funds for the Avro e.dvanced aircraft e.nd the launching ?f ~ crash ptogramme into anti-gravity power. To initiate such programn.es decades ahead of normal scientific development would indicate that the U. S . Government acknowledged the existcr.ce of advanced "aircraft" which presumably used a gravity-control method of propulsion. An additional motivation could have been the fear that the USSR would achieve this goal before the U. S . 3 . By erecting a facade of ridicule, the U. S . hoped to allay public alarm, reduce the possibility of the Soviet takin~ advanta~e of UFO mass sightings for either psychological or actual warfare purposes, and act as a cover for the real U.S. programme of devel~ping vehicles that emulate UPO ~erformances. The RAAF together with many other countries of the world give credence only to the USAF public facade and appear to have uncritically acce~ted the associated information . This information bas been widely discredited by retiring U. S . service personnel formerly engaged on UFO investigations, as well as hy scientists and private citizens. conclusions of the Condon report conflict ~ith its own contents and has been discredited by many reputable scientists i ncluding the UFO scientific consultant to the USAF. In accordance 4with the recommendations of the Condon report, Project BLUE BOOK was terminated, but presumably this would l1avc little effect on the main progr~r.~e. 5. It would appear wrong for Australia to remain ignorant ci the true situati~c. We lack an i ntelligence viewpoint th~t can assess the nature and possible consequence s of the problem, a scientific vieNpoint that could derive scientifically val)d data from the reports &nd a public relations viewpoint that can honest~y satisfy public interest. To overcome these deficiencies in the Australian investigation of UFO's, it would seem that a strong casG exis t s for the acceptance of the RAAF suggestion that another government department assume responsibi1ity for the investigation and analysis of UFO reports. U. S . OFFICIAL ATTITUDE TO U.F.0 In June of 1947 the Air Technical Intelligence Centre (ATIC) ncar Dayton, Ohio, assumed a repcnsibility to investigate the ini tia.l 1 ~polts of flying saucers Vi thin a month it was conside~cd that. the phenomena were real a!ld probably of Soviet or1g1n. By thP end of the year, when ATIC was officially authorised to invesliigatc under the project code na.n.e of SIGN and with a high priority,most nf the investigators wer~ focussing on an inter- planetary ra~her than a Soviet origin. These opinions were crysta:iliz~d into a written estimate that was soot to the Pentagon in September 1948. When the interplanetary cone lusions were re.J .)c~ed on th~ grounJs of insufficient bard evidence, a reaction set in at ATIC agains't trying to unravel the UFO problem. 2 . In Febru~ry 1949, ATIC personnel oc Project SIG~ were replaced witll ne\: personnel to form Project GRUDGE. A definite attempt was made during :!.9~9 to use Project GRUDGE to destroy any acceptance of UPO's. Toe ruotives for this are not clear: possibly Ai r Force embarrassment at being incap~ble of controlling the situation ltlld/.r a fear of national panic prompted USAF to try and remove the problem by denying its exis'tence. Another possibl e motive may have been to provide a breathing space for another "investigative agency" to reach some conclusion; the agency had been assisting ATIC through 1948 and, contrary to official USAF policy, was maintaining a high level of i nterest during 1949. This governmental agency was not tho FBI, and had rcckct, nuclea~ and intelligence experts ; their purpose was to study UFO reports in an effort to gather design data ou i nterplanetary spaceships. In the light of later developments, this agency was almost certainly the CIA. 3. Project GRUDGE failed to eliminate the UFO problem. UFO reports in 1949 actually exceeded the number in 1948, and several people ~bo had gained access to earlier official reports were able to contradict the USAF. Journalists generally felt that GRUDGE reporting represented a cover to a more serious kno~ledge. Eventually, USAF intelligence decided that a fresh approach to the problem was necessary. Between September 1951 and the establishment of Project BLUE BOOK in Narch 1952, UFO investigation regained adequate financial and administrative support to once again analyse the collected data. Project BLUE BOOK vas able to process the daLa from 3 , 200 reports into a form suitable for their consultants to be able to use IBN card- sorting machines. 4. The summer of 1952 saw a more tha n twenty-fold rise in the normal rate of reporting and inclu~ed the two extensive July sightings i n v<'l ving 'fashington D. C. This marked inc rease in sightin!!s had diverse eff.ects. A component of USAF intcliigence considered that UFO' s were interpla.neta~y spaceships which were about to make closer c~utact. To prepare the public for this possibility, 41 previously classified reports were relP.ased for publication between August 1952 en~ February 1953. These reports contradicted the earlie~ official USAF policy of dismissing the reports as mis- identificatinns etc. On the other hand, tho CIA regarded the su r UFO activity as a threat to national security mainly because the resulting c rnwded communications and defence forces involvement lessened the lPvc l of national alertness against possible enemy ~tt~ck. 5 . A scienti~ic ponel c haired by B. P . Robertson was ~onvened b~r the Office of Scientific Intalligence c! ~IA during mid-January 1953 for the purpose of r ecommending future action on the UFO problem. Briefings were n.a.de both by CIA and USil'. ATIG personnel showe(l t~\e then classified two movie films of UFO's and the early results of statistical analysis of 3 ,200 reports. Bacause of the vital issues involv~d, the panel felt re~tricted to recommending that the investigation be continued, but with i nc reased personnel and equipment. USAF responded promptly with an instrucLion to comply with these recommendations. The CB, however, in a report dated 16 February 1953 showed a prefer e nce to publicly aband on the investigaLion whilst intensifying the collection of data. By September 1953 the CIA position had been l argely achieved wit h Project BLUE BOOK reduced from a staff of ten qualified personnel operating at a top secret level to a virtually inactive project involving one airman. The i nvestigating component had been transferred to the 4602nd Air Inte~ligence Service Squadron vhich was trained in rapid intelligence procurement and reported to Ai r De fence Command and USAF Intelligence Washington rather than BLUE BOOK. Direct access between the 4602nd AISS and all USAF units was authorized by AFR 200- 2 whereas previously this privilege had boon given to BLUE BOOK. Although only the airman (first- c lass) remained in September 1943, BLUE BOOK was laLer built up to one officer , one sergeant, one secretary, and a pa.rL-timeconsultant ~ Dr J . Allen Hynek, staying at about this level until it was closed down in December 1969. During this time BLUE BOOK served mainly as a means of supplying unclassified summaries of UFO identifications It o the public, and did not form a vital link in collection or serious analysis. 1 . Control of public awareness of the UFO si tuati0n was tightened by the issuing of JANAP 146 in 1953 which prohibited service personnel from di~cussing UFO' s by threatening defaulters with up to 10 years gaol and up to a $10,000 fine. When service p e rsonnel resigned or retired, howe~er, 1t was possible to reveal USAF attitude~ o-opinions even if actual dA.ta was still restricte~. In this way many Intelligence _Offi~ers ~:~.ssoci~te-d-_with the UFO problem, inc luding Major D. Fournet who was BLUE BOOK Project Officer at the P entagon until l~te 1952, Captain E . Ruppelt who headed Project GRUDGE and Prt1ject BLUE BOOK until September 1953 and Admiral Hil lenkoetter who directed CIA from its inception until October 1950, on retiring from the services, all publicly stated that the U. S . Gove r n ment knc"-' UFO' s were extra-tcrrestia l but was withholding this fact from the public. When the National Investigation Committee on Aerial Phenom~na ( NICAP) was formed in 1956 to counter the publicly suppressed US.~ investigation of UFO's, the first Chairman was Admiral D.S. Fahrney who had directed the Navy's guided missile programme from its incepti o n . Apart from Admiral Hillenltoetter, Hajor Keyhoe and Major FournE>t, other Directors have inc:lufled Rear Admi!'al H. B. Knowles, Ge neral A. Wedemeyer and Col J . J . 3ryan (who was a special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force). To reduce the effect of these a nd similar defections from official policy after retirement, the revised J AP 146E, passed in 1960, made it an offence under the Espionage Act if data on UFO' s were revealed. change in style of USAF report1ng before and after the Robertson panel meeting is clearly indicated in the Project BLUE BOOK Special Report No. 14 . The body of the report prepared between March 1952 and early 1953, although biased in favour of a na~ural expl&nation for UFO' s , nevertheless sho"ed mathematically that the evidence favoured an explanation that was scientifically unknown. is section of the 316 page report was not released to the public other than as a copy to be consulted, assuming the reader knew of ~ its existence. Public distribution was made, however, of a so- called " s ummary" which in fact did not SWTimarisc, nor scarcely allude to the 1947-52 data, but concentrated on 1953-55 reportin~ vhich was cle..~.rly designed to reduce the residual unlrnowns to an insignificant number, no matter how senseless the identification 10. Within the body of the difficul t-to-ob t.ain repo'rt there is an interesting diagram. The product of the est~matcd ob~ervP.r reliability and ~he re~ort reliability became the s ighting r eliability. The percentage of reports that had to be registered a s "unknown" (i. e . incapable of being t.ve~l approximat ely identifiod as a known object) i ncreased as the sighting reliability impro1ed. Conversely, t h e percentage listed as "insufficien t information" decreased with improving reliability. eightiog No. of Unknown Insufficient Reliability Ini'ormation 11. Throughout the years of the UFO phenomenon, there bas been a persistent form of official pronouncements which state that the percentage of unknowns would be reduced if more data 'ere a.vaila~le. The above table contradicts t h a t statement. Reports of excellent reliability generally stem from astronomers, pilots, scientists, surveyors, meteorologists, radar operators etc. complete with instrumented values and accurately detailed accounts. The introduction of good reliable reporting pr~vcnts the ready prosaic interpretation. In all probability the overall average percentnge of unknowns (19.7%) would have been substantially increased if the deta had been more reliable. 12. Project BLUE BOOK consultants statistically tested the unknown object population to determine tho likelihood that it was similar to the population of identified objects and found that the probability was less than one in 10 ( i . e . using the American 4f s ystem, the odds were ten thousand trillion trillion to one agnins t. the un1wowns being the same as the knowns). Since the consultants had arbitrarily called all green fireballs and short duration (i. e . less than five seconds) n~ght-time sightings as known astronomical objects there was an undue preponderance in that catego~y. Hence, assuming that n~ n~tronomical objects were left in the unknowns, the statistical tests were repeated with astronomical iJentifications removed. Tne odds were reduced to ~n trilliou ~rillion to one. The analysts could not find a way to reduce tbos<:! odds sufficiently f urther to warrant additional esting, and irrationally considered the results to be "inconclusive". 13 . wnile PROJECT BLUE BOOK endeavoured to reduce the official number of unkr.owns -in 1957 they claimed only 14 out of 1,006 sigbtings remained unidentified -tbe cover t programme expanded considerably. The government agency (al~ost certainly CIA) tha~ had been collecting data on UFO perform~,ce and propulsion methods during 1948-52 presumably influenced U. S . governmental funding vf certain ~dvanced projects. One project was the Canadian Avro sau~er. A drawing of t.his saucer 1 eleased in Gctober 1955, showed a typical flying disc a~ dec;cribed in many UFO reports. The Secretary of th~ Air Force, D. A. Q~arles, appeared moderately confident that such a vehicle would be successfully developed by the U. S . 14. A more astounding decision on the part of the U. S . Government was to allocate considerable funds to investigate gravity and a means of controlling gravity. Despite the fact that science b ud not atLained .1 l~vel of competence to df'al with either gravity or anti-gravity problems and the only theory that. migh t be applicabl e was Einstein's Unified Field Theory which was stlll incomplete at the time of his deaLh, the U. S . chose to support six universities and government agencies in an all-out drive to conquer the problem. It is significant that at this time the cu~rent theories on UFO propulsion were a mixture of gravity contr o l and electro-magnetic propulsion. 15. During 1955, because insufficient staff could be recruited for the project, recourse was made to an urgent appeal for theoretical phys)~ists and mathematicians from AERE Harwell, U. K. The six Gravity Research Centres being established were at the Institutefor Advanced Study (Princeton, N. J .), Princeton University, University ~ of Indiana, Purdue University Research Fo\mdation, University of North Carolina and the Nassachusetts Institute of 'echnology through the (Roger Babson) Gravity Res~arch Institute (New Bost,n N. H.) . The latter institute is a non-pr~fi~ organization foundvd in 1949 with George H. Rideout as Pres~dcnt. It was believed that to make a gravity motor, a gravity differential was required which