2. L GC A T lOt~ : . NllMBE R OF OBJECTS . LENGTH OF OSSERVATION TYPE OF O BSERVATION ' C URSE 1 Se~ Case : 9. PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 10, CONCLUSION Sii~ tine : 11. BRIEF SUM.'rtARY AND ANALYSIS On Oct 6. events becan a t 2000 hours with tte v uul si.:~t:~ that continued fo~ J/4 hour o f an object over ~he occ . bearin; of 290 dee anc a n e levation of 10 -co 15 o...0[!.. .:: ..... object displayed "'o appreciable motion . The mi::::ile-'tr~c~<:..:-. radars, v1cre ,at 2045 osY.ec to qo into .;esrc.r. :::oce ant loo.-: f o r the object sighted visually. '.Yne resul t was 'thnt ::.::o~ objects were quickly ~icked up and track~d. COI'-1'~TS! See University of Colorado Report. f-TO S(P 63 0-3'29 (TDE) PrHio u o odlllono .-,C lhla Co""',,.., b .,. : Vandenberg S i ghthing Report L!. CoL Davis reported that there .,,as an invers]on I.J'f"!t at 1,'~00 t o 2,200 ft. Bu t it was gene rall y r~ported that the objects w~re abov~ the inversion. All obs e rver1 [ndicated t~at t he night was ex edlngly c1ear. lor e n ';J. Crow, consulting meteor ologist, has przpar~d 3 detailed .-vea t her n!port, which i s incl uded a s n part of this s ighting .-~dght-up . ~valuation and. Concluslons Radar Tests October 9th and Novemb"!r 8t h On October 9t h , underweather c onditions similar t o October 6th but wi t h more wlnd , more clouds t and coaler temper a t u re s , the FPS-16 was flred up to de termine if t h e same targets coul d be seen agaln. I n fact. t a rgets having t he same gene r a l char acteristics were acquired. but they were reported to be no t as strong. o ot~er ope rators, wo r klng on aa unofflcJat basts with a different radar , i ndi cated t ha t they 3ome "of the same sort of s tuff" on t he evenings of the 9 t h and the lOth.- November 8th, the night of ~ur second visit, t he same or simila r targets were acquire d .on t he FPS-16 a nd TPQ-1 8 . The radar experts among those present (Blackmer/ Brook., Collis, Herold, Lhermitte) irrrnediately requested that printouts be obtaine d glvlng information on signal s trength . This tnfonnatlon was no t available, because the operator s t take steps to p r int i t ou t , for the observations or Octobe r 6th The behtwior and characteristics of t he targets appeared to be consistent with t he hypo t hesis tha! was ~eveloped dur i ng the discuss ions J~ndenberg Slghting Re port ::::~rl iet" on November 3th, namely. th.~': r~ost of th:! r3Jar targets 'n1:!r'~ Jn ct ~irds. tndlvidual ~irds, having a :ross section approx1~ately equiv~Jent to that . o f one 1uart of W3ter, woJl~ ~reduce signal 3trengths consistent with those observed. (The targets observed the niqht of 'lovember 8tn , according to calculations made b y Dr . Lhermit:z, yielded 3 rada~ cross section of approxlmately 10 em-.) The velocitJas a nd coherent t racks of: the targets also suggested consistency '!'lith the bir d hypothesis. What hadapparently been overlooked initially (and for a ,,,hilelt .fooledthe experts) was that, with the fourth-power l aw operating , the slgnal strength produced by a bir d close. in, with radars the FPS-l6 and especially tl~e-TPQ-18, would be very-Jarge, but It would drop off extr err.ely rapidly with inc:r-easing dlstance Jt became apparsnt,'from examination 0f the data available f rom the tape and the printouts, that the high slgnaJ strengths were- a~soeiated with targ~ts at close range. No attemot was ma de at the time of the-t . .'~ightJngs to associate ranges and signal strengths. Had someone asked.;\~'Whe~t Y9U..:get a n 80 db'" sf gna 1, what range do you read?" the zvenlng-would probably have had a d ifferent conclusi on. OpP.ratlng. ;:>ro c;.Sddres mi ght;_..in the futUra, very welt provide, wnEm unldentffJed target~are cau5Jn~vconcern, .. that ranges.and 5ignal strengths be related to one another. , The author is not aware of the existence of any ~rocedure to be followed that would lead toward the prompt explanation of unicenttfled adar targets of an unusu~l natura e . g . Insects. s ide-bbe ~choes, nomaious ec~oe~ from objects on t~e ground, ~tc. In the absence of ~uch a p rocedure, the ooerators involved in t h i g case hand1ed t he ~;tu~tJoo reasonably, and their ~erformance J s not to be ~rlticized . t:moeno-,rg Si~ht;ing Reaon: ll r;,e y wer~ ul J extr~mely helpf u l to Color.::.rlo P roj t .7Jembdrs ; , trr..cinq the causes of t he ev~nlng's event s . G~0eral Conclusions Th i s is a remarkaol~ serie s o t slghtings, f o r two reasons", f l rst, because of the extraordinarily hlgh qualificat i ons of t he o bservers,. and, second, because of the availability of the hard data. The r e I~ no other UFO case in the r.!cords of the Colorada Project t hat contains as many numbers, repl"esentlng quantities like range , azrmuth, elevatio n > and velocity. Information, from which. signal strength _could nave been computed, would 'also have. been availabl e had tha o pe rators thought to pr.lnt-._lt out , but they d t d not at was necessary, to r~late signal d-fd range s for these events, 't q gd. back to t he tape o f the . conversations ~nd dlg out the reports -of s ignal str engthsy whi~h, when asslgned preci~-~ tlJ~s (fo~tun~.tely, the ~ape contained good t~mJ.ng ;efere.nces),~. ld'be co~ared ith the p~intouts of range, whi'ch a.lso inc:Juded t.im.ng:refaren~es~'J. Information on the visual slghtings.was, . exc. f_or .. t,_h~.'~t.gfr; credibp tty o! the .. observers, the same as 1 n othe r r~p<)rts of UFO"slghtlngs l!l t})e Colorado_files !hat is to say; there wen no re 1 i ably measured quantItatIve va 1 ues ava i lab 1 a from such s l gh t t ngs . .. The detailed weather-study, by Lo r e n Crow, ,. as not avai laole at the t lme' o f t he November trip to-Vandenberg, and lt was not known at that tJme that the weather conditions wer e f n fact so unusuaL The reader's a ttentron S report, t n '.Nh i ch i ndicated t hat et VAFB, although return flow (that r..n on-shor e b reeze) at the surface:was well establis hed by the l a t e afternoon of October 6th, ::he flow at 2,000 ft. was stJ11 fror.1 the northeast, so that there exlsted ', ~narrow tongueof warm, d ry air overlylng the cool, ist air . r.~is 11~ndenber3 Sighti ng Re po r t :ongue 0f .:Jir extend~d c;outnward :1l:nos t t o San Nlcoias island ~ut stoo?ed ~ere. At Sa n Nicol~s, there w re~urn flow on the surf3ce ~nd up to 3 ,000 ft., but easterly flow persist-ed above 3 ,000 ft. all the \v<'~y to 10,000 f t . As the chart shows, :here we r e strong gr3dients o f ~oistur~ a nd tempe;ature.at both stations. Cr~w ha s pol~ted out that the temp~r- a ture ' and moisture cont rasts are p robably even ')reater than those shown, because the 5urface asurements were not made at the surface, but a t some distance above t he 5urface. One concludes, from study of the weat~er r~port.that co~d~tlons were very favorable Indeed f o r opt1cal mitage and sclntJllation and fo~ anomalous radar propagation. '"'It should be noted that the event that set off t he entir e sequence o f events was an o~tJcal s ighting at 8:00~ The r e i s a strong ~ossibillty that the stlmulus for t h i s sjghtlng was due to the r unning ights o f a ship below the horJzon, seen as a result of mirage. The conditions for such a mirag~were present; but it must be pointed out that;:..Payer and Atherton. were most emphatic that the object appeared a t an-elevation angle of abou t ' 10~ tton:~of a ship's lights. be: low the That Is. too high for~mirage observa- Hence , either their reports of ttte-e1evatfon angleare 1ncorrectro,. some other explanation must be- A further fact is of lnter~st, and that is t hat, In t he Ope~ations Control Center'on November 8th, o ne of the operators of a search radar indicated t hat he never saw any s h i ps, t hat the shipp ing lanes were too f.:~roff the coast f o r ships to be seen by radar f rom that location, althOugh the antenna was at an altitudeof appr oximately 1 ,000 ft. He thereupon switched to ;,;s tOC>st d i stant range ( 80 miles), and irr:medfatel y a sprinkling of biJps ~ppeared at extreme range . They turned out t o oe Vandenber~ S ighcing R~oort ason to supposa, from .-3 quicl< >~uoy 0 f t;oJeathr~r -:of"di~lqns on th~ "1iJht of Novembe r 8 th, tha t anorilolous :;>r op.agatlon had JO'fthlng to '10 ~'lith thJs observation of ships, i t must b e concl~ded that they could be s n any tirne. The o nly reasonabl~ ex;:>lanation, therefor~, of the ope rator ' s statement that he never saw ships on the scope i s that p1he n~v~r looked for them before. Payer and Atherton indicated that larg e s hips were never seen visually from the coast off Lompoc, a n d that I~ undoubtedly ~orrect, becausa they would be belcw the horizon. Computations show, hoWever, that . wi ~h mirage cond 1 tions, the runnin g l i gh t s of ships would be visible at~tha 80-mlle range indicated by the r adars. .:If one 1s satisfied to overlook the f nconslstant. report elevation angle of the initial visual s ighting (lo to 15 ) and assi gn its c:ause to o ptical mirage, then one can say t hat that Is what set c f f the e nsulng chain of events . Th~ operators or the missile tracktng radan lnsh.ted." ~hat they.had never, except on one ~r two occasions when .theywere.also 1ociktng f o r UFOs, used t heir r adars Sn a search rrode . _-on those other-occasions~ they had seen nothing. and subsequently onOctober.9th and lOt~ and November 8th, they saw This t t me , howe,ve,.; targsts.--At:no. trme did tne surveillance rad3rs pick up unldent!fled targets. Because-of the enol mous p~r and concentrated be-3m o f the trackin-g radan, the hypothesis that some of the objects seen .o~ere birds appears consistent with all t h e fac~s that a r e known. ~low that the - we~ther r~port is available, It also.would seem hlghly p robable that some of the radar targets seen-were due to anor.~lous p ropagati on. Ther~ extsted strong enough g r adlents "t o p roduce e choes f rom atmospheric dis- c~ntlnuitles, and, together with the u~usual cir~umstances for visual observation, the condition~ were p r-asent to p roduce ,.,hat :1appened-a 'J.Jndenbtirq Si~hting P.eport ~vroce in a l~r:cr ~aced t~ov-anber 3. l t would seem tnat most of the inexplicability of tr~ ~v~nts i n this case (and ~ossibly i n ny others} rlrl5~s not ~ the facts themselves, (i.a., th~ spdcific sighting~. ~tc., ~t any 3lven instant) but ln the intar p retation nade and s i g nificance attached to them when t ney we r e consi dered i n tnappr opr iate juxtapositions. The way i n which this was do ne at the ti:ne under operational pressures and even subs~quently ~rovi~es, i n my opinion, a most Important object l e sson. It does Indeed! Thelesson l.s that the fla;:> could have been avoi ded; tha :alrcraft need not have been scrambled. I t is unlikely they will be a gain at \landenberg under those cl rcurnstances, but it could happen someplace ehe -.:. unless the ~andenberg experience ts communicated, through the adop~lon of approprlate.operatlng p rocedures or in son~ ~thermanner, _to other operators of powerful tracking radars. Spec:lal appreciation i~ extended to John Payer for his assistance in arranging the meetlngsy discussions, and,gubsequent radar expert- ments that .led to the probable solutlon of thJs case. He went cut of hh WaY to he.l p; PTT~ZYUW RUWJSLA9312 2852~15- E--~UZDFIF. F ~1 H hl A F tv T R V !~ F 8 C ~ L I F RUEDPIF/~TO ~?AF3 OHIO RUSfHJA/ CS.~F ~IJ~FH~,V OS.~F l.IJASHDC UN~LAS E F T 0 3LU~ SU?.F ~TOOP-4 2~34J OCT 1957 FQ:i FTD CT!J!::T:=n P4F3: C3AF AF~DC): OSAF CS~F-Cll) SU3J~CT: UFO R~PORT O~i IriS E:V~NIN3 OF 5 19G7, SVE~AL UFJ SIG~TIN3S ~S ?ORIS ~ER~ TZLEPHO~ZD TO T AI~ FORC~ WE3T~2N T~ST RA~G~ CAF~T~> GJ'li='li1'1::D VISU~L SIShTI~;.:;_; OF LFO A'D DI~:::CTt:!) q~\J3~ :1t:TRIC T C,IW3 ~A)!\::i SY:3T'::~:3 T:J \TT ElYi?T ACQUISITIO~i. F?S-16 , TP9- l 3 PAS~ 2 RU.A/JSLA9312 UNCLAS E: F T 0 " . !A?ID CH-it-.i3~ IN 30TH :::L EVATION AND AZI~lUTH. I T \~,lAS ::n:T:::~iiP~0 THAT O? TH~3 I~ 0~ AB8UT IrE \lf\NC~NBERG AF3 !\R5:A. 11-1 ?ACIFIC !~ISSIL:": R4N3E CPM~) WAS 4SK~D T O 3RING ANY 4VAILA3L~ MET~IC T RACKING RADAR TC 9~AR I N TH~ VAFS A~EA TO CONFIRM A F ~TR RADAR CONTACTS . PMR CO!~FI~:Yi~u t.-..: , !1 .._J '-"""' -\ v-OF MULTIPLE T ARGETS IN THE VAF3 AREA. 'AS pop--n T THE l S TRAD COif:MAND POST. THE 27TH AIR DIVISI ON OF ADC vU~.s ADVIS:C:u OFH T SIG~TIN3S. TH::: ADC SC~AMBLE D A TOTAL OF 3 FLIGHTS OF 2 AIRCRAFT EACH ID AF \VT?. CONTROL FOR H~V=:STI3ATION OF CONTACTS. A C0~13INATIO OF MET RI C TR~CKIN3 AN) SURVEILL;\1\C RADARS WERE US2D FOR tl,l RCRAFT V:::'CTORING T J I ))TERC t:P T. EACH FL I 3.riT \VAS 24J~R CONTACT ~AS REPORTED SEVERAL TIMSS BY THS AIRCRAFT, TAR3:::TS DISAPPEA~LD F~OM T SCOPE WHEN A?PROACHING AT CLOS~ RANG:::. VISU!l,L Rl:'POKT \. AS CP.LLED FP.OM TH;:: .~IRC~AFT OF FLIGHT NLWJ3~R 2 , 3UT \rJAS LOSTOt\ C!..JSI~G. SU3S::QUEI':T ATTC:f~PTS T O REACQUIRE v.'~RE Nt:2fl.TIVE. 'J~') I."VESTI~ATIO:~ ';JAS Ti::?.f~IN.'~TED AT 39'32Z 7 OCT. D VI SI3ILITY ~T L~AST 12 ~:.CO~Vf:::) LCU2 M\J S -.O?T P ~::?!ODS PF. Y:'AC!< OVE:R A 3 HOU2 P~RI:JD.