PROJECT 100/3 RECORD CARD 2.. LOCATION 12. CONCLUSIONS 0 Wos Balloon ~0 Seo tomber 1957 ~ian t :.1 uk N.Y. to Benson, Pa o Probably Boli-n ssi bl Y Boil oon Local------------0 Ground-Visual XD.Ground- Roclor Was Aircraft 0 Probably Aircrah noc t 1917<7 o A y 1 0 A 1 R c1 0 Possibly Aircraft if . 6. SOURCE 0 Was Astronomical 0 Yes 0 Probably Astronomical a No USAF Radar Units o Possibly Astt'Onomic:.,ol 7. LENGTH Ofi.OBSERVATIOH 8. HUMBER OF OBJECTS 9. COURSE aXOther & ECrl 0 Insufficient Data for Evaluatio n aoryrox 1 2 minutes e aact nr not 275 dgr app 10. BRII!fl SUMMARY 0, SIGHTING giVen 11. COMMENTS Two radar untis (one i o N. Y. & other Inv~stigations disclose that there in Pa) observed hig h speed targets was nu equipment malfunction in heading west. Alerted other radar first radar unti; when frequency units a long a pre-plottcJ track. Fighter/ change(!, spuri.ous targets d isnp- i n t e rcep tP.r units (/\DC) i 11 i\1 i.ch igan & pe::\ r~u. I /Determined that two SAC Wisconsin sc,.ambled t o 1nt~1Tept. No rt/r wer e dl~oppi.n streams of rr~dar rootact mHde. Nothiog untt.:.;ual seen . Tar-chaff in nre a . Also, the target s g2 ts fad eel. P.ad~.r inv0 . ; 1 u~:-t. Lion t e a m shown in the sc t were compl e t ely set up to -::~eel< this jn,i.d,~nt. Fil'lding:;nhuormal .//Conclusions: No com- made in c:;pecial report ( 111 cn.:;e file ) . rJ~..:.l in~ r eason chr indications that tnrgets were l:ostile o r enemy . a/ c or l'liss i les. ATJC PORM 329 (REV 26 SU 52) u CLf\SlF\ED EVALUATION OF AIR DEFENSE INCIDENT OF 20 SEP~ffiER STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES The objective of this study is to evaluate the circumstances associated with the detection and reporting of high-speed radar tracks on 20 September 1957. Specifically, the evaluation was aimed at determining whether or not the tracks were caused by airborne objects and to determine, if possible, the nature of the airborne vehicles or other phenomena which caused the tracks. RESUME OF EVENTS 1. On 20 September 1957 at 19o6Z, the 773d ACWRON, located at the Montauk AFS, ~f"!w York, established an initial plot on a high speed unidentified object southeast of the station at a range of 190 nautical miles, 'lnJ. tracking toward the station at an estimated speed of 3600 kn > t 1 . '['rack information was forward told to the 26th CONAD Divit:;l on} CFECR, and to NORAD COC. In addition, it was passed laterally t o adjacent radars; the 646th ACWRON at Highlands AFS, N.y. and the 7o2d ACWRON at North Truro, Massachusetts. These radars were not able to establish contact with the target. 2 . The unknown track was lost at a range of 50 miles southeas t of Montauk at 1907 . 45Z. The track was dead -reckoned by t-1ontauk AFS and passed by the 26th CONAD Division to the 648th ACWRON a t Benton AFS, Pennsylvania, as heading west at a speed of 2 , 000 knots and a n estimated altitude of 50}000 feet. UNCLJ\SS\f\ED discussed with the NO~ team the events leading up to, and those associated with, the detection and reporting of the high speed tracks on 20 September 1957. The details of the above discussions along with the NORAD team observations are contained in the following paragraphs. MONTAUK AFS: Montauk Air Force Station is located on the northeastern tip of Long Island, N. Y. The following i s a list of radar equipment and operating parameters associated with this station at the time of the incident: Prime Sear ch /FPS-20 Emergency Search AN/FPS-8 Height f.}ulpne!lt AN/FPS- 6 o ta tlon Rate AN/FPS- 20 Antenna Tilt (Electrical) ( 1250- 1350 me) Dual Channel (1280- 1350 me) non~perational Pulse Hec urrence Frequency 400 pps Blip/Scan :\at l o on BB -6 from D~tection to Fade 1.0 a . Circumstances Related by the Montauk Operations Personnel: Prior to the detection of the high speed track BB-6, the duty controller was engaged in an intercept over the Rocket and, Gunnery Range south of the Montauk Station. Scope di~plays and the appearance of routine traffic seemed normal. At approximately 1905 48z, a target return was observed on a PPI console at a range of approximately 210 n .mi. east southeast of the station. An initial track was e stablished on it at 19o6Z, The scope operator immediately called this track to the attention of the duty controller and the floor supervisor. The three operations personnel observed this track throughout tts course until it faded at approximately 50 n .mi. southeast of the station. Thi s fade occurred within the M. rrw., area. The average speed of the track over its entire length was 5,400 knots. At the time of the incident, there:: were 3 UPA-35, GPS- 23 consoles and one height scope in operation. basis for the altitude estimation on track BB-6 was so unreliable the NORAD team was forced to disregard it. Derivation of hei~t associated with part of track BB-6 is discussed later in this report. 'l'h~ acge ~ was detected and tracked on a UPA-35 scope but it was not oos~rved on the height finder nor on any other scope in the operations room; however, due to the short time that this target was carr1eJ, it was impossible for the operations personnel to evaluate or aJ dd the conditions of the other scopes in the operations room. ~f,) jamming or intense interference were present at thls time and weath~r in thi s area was low overcast with sl~ght r~in. Further weather apalysis is included later. receipt of the initial target information, the 26th AD alerted other related sites within the 26th AD area to be on the lookout for this high speed tr!l.ck. The statio:1s ini7.;ally alerted were Highlands and North Truro. Subsequently, Claysburg, Pa. , Benton, Pa., and Lockport, N. Y. were alerted as a result of dead-reckoned pre-plot information. None of these stations excep t Benton, Pa., detected acything that could possibly have been correlated with track BB-6. Antiaircraft units in the area of the track penetration were also advised but were unable to obtain con- tact with this target. Texas Tower #2, the picket ships and AEW stations in the area did not report unusual, high speed targets during this time. characteristics of the target b lip described by the three operations personnel indicated that this return appeared realistic insofar as shape and size were concerned. The initial target ret~n obA~rve~ at 210 n.mi . was thought to be that of an aircraft showing Hark X identification. Several sweeps later the Mark X beacon r;ort ~.r'1l u t the scope was placed in t h e off position but the target u u . fH! teristics remained the same. As the target approached the otation, the size diminished but the intensity re- mained the same . 'i'racking continul ty and blip/ scan wer e 10a{o throughout the !rt' t :e track. The FPS -20 was operating on Channel 2 during this period. At 191Cfl, Channel 2 failed and the set went off the air. Thirty seconds 1a "Ler Channel 1 was in operati on. A defective tube in the modulator caused the above failure. Set operation and ' nsole noise level appeared normal during the time of the incident. b . NORAD rrea.n Observations At 200C2 on ?.5 S ptember _. the NORAD team observed a series of ~dom blips on a UPA-35 con- sole. 'rhese blips occurred at a constant azimuth of 1600 but at various ranges. The operations personnel lnvolved in the 20 U H Cl/1,SSI FlED September incident were called to observe this and they immediately identified the blips as being exactly the same as those observed on 20 September. The variations in ranges were to some degree uniform in their appearance, i . e., the blips would occur at approximately 210 n .mi. , approach the station at speeds of 3, 000 to 3 , 500 knots for 3 or 4 sweeps then would appear at a different range unaccept- able to track coherence. Other scopes in the operations room were also displaying these blips. This condition was observed throughout the night by the opera t iona personnel a t Montauk. The next morning the transmi tteC' was changed to Cbanh.el l o.nd the condl ti.on disap- ared. At the request of the NORAD team, on the evening of 26 September, the slte changed back to Channel 2 and the condition again appeared. Tb.t fol.l.owing is a munmary of the most important characteristics of, and technical environment surrounding, the Montauk target ph~nomenon on 20 September 1957. th~ jr.l tial stage of detection, this object' s electronic configuration was described as slmilar to that of B- 52 type aircraft llhen ob served at long range, w1 tb the exception of its speed. Several sweeps later the electronic configuration of this target changed to that of a smaller object, yet the heading of the target and its aspect remained constant. Normal target returns f:om conventional or j e t type aircraf t do not. re..o:'le~ t .Juch .cadical changes in their size as this target did unless they undergo radical changes in aspect ratio. In fact, it i s very difficult for experi- enced operators to detect changes in target ni.ze vhPn the aircraft is maintaining a constant track. \'lllnv0 The target intensity of track BB-6 remained constant throughout the entire tracking period. Normal target returns fluctuate in intensity to such a degree that the condition is visually obvious to the operator. Tracking was continuous and the blip/scan ratio was 1 . 0 over the entire track. A 1 . 0 blip/scan ration on conventional and jet aircraft without beacon or Mark X is a rare occurrence under normal operation. fac t that this target was of such size to sustain 1.0 blip/scan l'EI.Ll o a t Montauk AFS would indicate that other sta- tions within dete t.L-:m d istances certainly sh ould have received some indication of thl~ .r~ck. Mutu~:~.l lnterference, that is, interference of one rotating radar wi t.h another rotating radar operating a t or fairly close to the srun~ op~ratlonal parameters ~dll normally produce "spirals" occurr in~ ..1. t tJ'te outer edge of the PPI scope and spiraling into the center ol' tl . .e scope along with extremely high background noise levels. Th~ nolse level on t.he scope, of course, is proper- tional to the power transmitted by the interfering r adar. It was impossible to associate track BB-6 with previously experienced mutual interference patterns of two r otating radar s . It would be possible, hovever, to generate a cordltiun of this :..;oct vi'h \:l fixed- antenna type radar operating at or close to the frequen cy and PRF of the rotating radar. The t eam was unable to ascertain the location of any fixed radar stations in that area that could p-roduce such a UN CLf-\SS\ rl ED condition. The non-rotating radar station would have to have mobility in view of the movement of this phenomenon from one azimuth. to another over a period of severa l days, and .i. ts installation would have had to hav e been made recently due to the absence of this type phenomenon in the past. 3. BENTON AFS: Benton Air Force Station is located approximately 35 n.mi. NW of Wilkes-Barre , Pa. The following is a list of equip- ment and operating parameters associated w1 th this station at the time of the incident: Primary Search Equipment Height flndlng Equipment An tenn.a ~; J .a L i c n Rate Antenna ~Ll~ ) Electrical) Pulse Re~urren~e Frequency Blip/Scan on BB-6 and BE-111 om Detection to Fade Search 1.5 Vertical Lower 30 Vertical Center 6 Vertical Upper 119 a. Circumstances Related By Benton Operations Personnel: Prior to detection o f high speed track BB- 6 , traffic and scope pre- sentations at Benton were normal. At 1755Z and 17~8Z two SAC aircraft requested permission to run ECM against Benton. The duty controller adyised apur ova.l and the two aircraft commenced chat't' r.ms at. l805Z and 1810Z, respectively. Aircraft dropped chaff in streams north of- the station extending west to approxlinately 220 n . mi. Chaff dispensing ended at 1832Z and 1835Z . The residual effects of the ch~ff cloud Yrt"!J"P visible on t he ra.r.iar con3o Le3 1'o.:-CJrr:_ an L..Jur' :> period. At 1916z, Benton received four overlap pre-plots from 26th AD Control Center on an unidentified target said to be heading west at 2 , 000 knots with en estimated altitude of 50,000 feet. At 1917Z Benton detected a target on the vertical upper beam heading north- west with an estimated speed of 920 knots. This target was correlated as being BB-6 from Montauk. The track was carried on VU until contact was lost at a point approximately 135 n . mi. northwest of the stati.on. It was again picked up on vertical center and tracked until it faded at 1926z. No further pickup on this track was made. 192hz Lhe second track was detected on V'J 75 n . mi. north of the station heading 2900, estimated speed 1 ,200 knots. This track had no correlatio n nnu ~.~as numbered BE-111. It was carried on VU until contact was lost &. ~ .1. point approximately 145 n .mi. northwest of the station. It was again picked up on vertical center at 160 n . mi. northwest and carried until it faded at 190 n.mi., 305. Both tracks were interr o - gated by Mark X w1 t-.!" no response. All track information was passed to the ACW s ite at LoeKport and Claysburg but these sites did not detect either of these tracks. Lockport was off the air for maintenance during the entire time B~nt~n was tracking and did not return to operation until one minute after the track BE-111 faded. Lockport observed the residual effects of the chaff drop. Anti-alrcraft units in the area of concern did not report any unusual, high-speed target activity. B-)8 aircraft activity wau consldared as a poosible cause for the track at Benton AFS; however, a message to WADC established that no 58s were flying in this area at this time Technical data and radar performanc~ characteristics 'associated with B-58 aircraft are non-existent at this time and as a assess the target data derived and properly associate this data with B-58 characteristics. At the time of the .incident, Benton had one OA-99 PPI console on each of the three vertical beams and the Air Surveillance Officer used a fourth OA-99 to monitor all beams. Of these, only one OA-99, manned by two airmen, displayed the targets (first on the VU and then on the VC b t>wua). No detection of BB-6 or BE-111 'tl8.S made on any other scope in the utation. No detections were made on FPS-6 or on the VL or search bea.m ... ol' the FPS-10. The operating parameters of the FPS-10 were within normal operating limits. Weather at this station was l ow overcast with slig,.'1t drizzle . ' b . NOPXJ ream Observa tiona : The NORAD team was unable to duplicate the abo, .. condition by scope analysis. All scopes had indi- cations of interfer ence patterns typical of those that would be generated by interference from other radars. The technical parameters associated with this type interference should not produce crossing tracks. The degree of this interference was not sufficient to deteriorate the perfor- mance of the station. The radar returns as d escribed by the operations pc:-r..;onnel lndi~ate that these returns .,,rn,:-c not ch.are . ..;t~ristic o!' no.n::al radar targets. Except for the high rate of speed and unexplained variations .in speed, the blips described a normal aircraft track. These b.l.ips differed f rom normal returns in t.hat t,hey wet'e round in shape vi th a slight fuzziness around the periphery and were est1mated to be about twice the diameter of a return from a B- 52 at ma.xjmum radar range. The intensity of the blips remained constant throughout the entire track. Tracking continuity and blip-sca n ratio was 1 . 0 . The following is a summary of the characteristics of, and technica l environme nt surrounding, the Benton target ph enomenon on 20 Septem- The two tracks did not possess qualities of normal raila r returns, ., they had a 1 . 0 blip-scan ratio throughout the e